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I. CONTENDING DEFINITIONS OF "COMMERCE"
For many years, there has been a simmering quarrel in the
legal literature over the scope of the term "commerce" in the
Constitution's Commerce Clause. 2 Before 1937, the Supreme
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.").
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE: This footnote collects alphabetically the secondary
sources cited more than once in this Article. The sources and any unusual short form
citations used are as follows:
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005).
MATTHEW BACON ("A GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE"), A NEW
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW (1736-66).
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101 (2001) [hereinafter Barnett, Original].
Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003) [hereinafter Barnett, New].
WINDHAM BEAWES, LEX MERCATORIA REDIVIVA (3d ed. 1771).
Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV.
695 (1996).
RICHARD BLAND, AN INQUIRY INTO THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES
(1766), available at http://www.rbc.eduflibrary/SpecialCollections/images/inquiry-
bland.pdf.
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1628-44).
JOHN COMYNs, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1780).
WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES (1953).
TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY, OR, GENERAL
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW (3d ed. 1783).
John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, in EMPIRE AND NATION
(Forest McDonald ed., Liberty Fund 1999) (1962).
DANIEL DULANY, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING TAXES IN
THE BRITISH COLONIES (1766).
JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1836).
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Court's interpretation was that the Clause authorized Congress
to regulate only buying and selling across state lines-the sort of
thing we might label economic exchange, economic intercourse,
or mercantile trade. 3 In that year, Walton Hale Hamilton, an
economist and law professor with ties to the Roosevelt
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1987).
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
[hereinafter FARRAND].
A GENERAL TREATISE OF NAVAL TRADE AND COMMERCE (1753) [hereinafter
GENERAL NAVAL].
WALTON H. HAMILTON & DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN: THE
CONSTITUTION-THEN AND Now (1937) [hereinafter W. HAMILTON].
GILES JACOB, A NEW LAw-DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1762) [hereinafter JACOB,
DICTIONARY].
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
(Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
HERBERT A. JOHNSON, IMPORTED EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LAW TREATISES IN
AMERICAN LIBRARIES 1700-1799 (1978).
CHARLTON T. LEWIS, A LATIN DICTIONARY (Oxford Univ. 1980) (1879).
CHARLES MOLLOY, DE JURE MARITIMO ET NAVALI (1769).
FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM (1985).
Robert G. Natelson, Tempering the Commerce Power, 61 MONT. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Natelson, Tempering].
Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, Necessary and Proper].
Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. L.J. 469 (2003)
[hereinafter Natelson, Enumerated].
Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve
State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Nelson &
Pushaw, Rethinking].
JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED
(1764).
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A
Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185 (2003) [hereinafter Pushaw, Methods].
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation
of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2002) [hereinafter Nelson &
Pushaw, Critique].
THOMAS WHATELY & GEORGE GRENVILLE, THE REGULATIONS LATELY MADE
CONCERNING THE COLONIES, AND THE TAXES IMPOSED UPON THEM, CONSIDERED
(1765).
JAMES WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE AND THE EXTENT OF THE
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT (1774).
3 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) (noting that "the
word 'commerce' is the equivalent of the phrase 'intercourse for the purposes of
trade'"); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549-50
(1935) (noting the distinction "between commerce 'among the several States' and the
internal concerns of a State"); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895)
(describing commerce as "the commercial intercourse between nations and parts of
nations").
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administration, wrote a short book called The Power To Govern:
The Constitution-Then and Now. 4  Douglass Adair, later an
eminent historian, was listed as co-author, but subsequently
disclaimed most of the credit (or blame) for the project. 5
Although appearing in book form and sometimes cited in
scholarly literature, 6 The Power To Govern was squarely in the
tradition of American political pamphleteering. Professor
Hamilton apparently had lost his position with the National
Recovery Administration when the Supreme Court declared that
agency's enabling legislation unconstitutional.7 The Power To
Govern was dominated by an attack on the Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. 8 Hamilton found the Court's retention of a
constitutional distinction between commerce and production
politically unacceptable. 9 "The word 'commerce' has no natural
boundaries[,]" 10 he declared. "[A] newer common sense declares
that industry lacks the capacity for self-government; that
regulation lies beyond the state's [sic] competence; and that the
only choice is between Federal control and chaos."11
4 W. HAMILTON, supra note 2.
5 See Trevor Colbourn, Introduction to FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
ESSAYS BY DOUGLASS ADAIR at x (1974). Adair was a very young man, having just
obtained his master's degree and not yet his doctorate, who was serving as
Hamilton's research assistant. He later said the production was "chiefly the writing
of Walton Hamilton; he was extremely generous to add my name on the title page."
Id. at n.1.
6 See, e.g., Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 9 n.34; Conrad J.
Weiler, Jr., Explaining the Original Understanding of Lopez to the Framers: Or, the
Framers Spoke Like Us, Didn't They?, 16 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 163, 183 n.83
(2004).
7 Hamilton was a member of the National Recovery Administration Board in
1934-35. Richard T. Fleming, The Handbook of Texas Online, http://www.tsha.
utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/HH/fha38.html (last visited July 22, 2006). The
case that declared the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional was
Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 495.
8 See W. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 9-18 (examining and criticizing Supreme
Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence). The particular decision he chose in his
opening was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), not the case that
apparently had cost him his job, but rather the Court's most recent pronouncement.
See id. at 9.
9 See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at 301-04 (finding a distinction between production
and trade).
10 W. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 14.
11 Id. at 193; accord id. at 17 ("A growing opinion has it that competition is
inadequate to its economic task; that the matter lies beyond the competence of the
several states; and that the real choice is between federal regulation and industrial
disorder.").
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Much of The Power to Govern was devoted to arguing that
the Commerce Clause should be reinterpreted to grant Congress
authority to regulate the entire national economy. Professor
Hamilton supported this argument with historical citations
purporting to show that the Court had erred in limiting
"commerce" to mercantile trade. On the contrary, he maintained,
during the founding era, "'commerce' had come to be a glorious
domain. It included trade, manufacture, and the staples;
comprehended all arrangements which lay outside the domestic
[i.e., home] economy .... 12
Hamilton's broadside could be dismissed as the idiosyncratic
rant of a disappointed former officeholder. What came next,
could not. In Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
United States,13 published in 1953, University of Chicago law
professor William Winslow Crosskey devoted scores of densely-
packed pages to arguing that when eighteenth century English
speakers used the term "commerce," they did not necessarily
limit themselves to traffic and trade. Rather they intended to
designate, quite often anyway, the entire scope of gainful
economic activity: "[I]t would seem that 'commerce[ ]' . . is
used," he wrote, "to mean the whole economy, the whole system
of exchange, the whole congeries of interrelated gainful activities,
which the American nation is to carry on."'14 He further asserted
that the Supreme Court had misapprehended the constitutional
phrase "among the several States."15 It did not mean "between
states," he said. It meant "throughout the nation."' 6 By the
original understanding of the Constitution, that is, the
Commerce Clause empowered Congress to regulate not only
mercantile trade crossing state lines, but all gainful economic
activity throughout the country. The authority of Congress
extended to interstate-and intrastate-agriculture and land
use, mining, services, and manufacturing.
Professor Crosskey's interpretation of "among the several
States" has not won many adherents. Commentators, however,
continue to be attracted to his broad definition of "commerce."
12 W. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 61.
13 CROSSKEY, supra note 2 (discussing the Commerce Clause in detail at 69-
110).
14 Id. at 95; accord id. at 117 ("[Tlhe power conferred by the clause becomes one
'to govern generally every species of gainful activity carried on by Americans . .
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 See CROSSKEY, supra note 2, at 50-83.
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Professors Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. and Grant S. Nelson are two
distinguished examples. 17 In 2005, Professor Akhil Reed Amar
pushed the argument yet further, averring that "commerce"
meant all forms of intercourse, economic or not.18
By contrast, other commentators continue to argue that
"commerce" in the Constitution means only mercantile trade. So
maintained Professor Richard Epstein in his 1987 article on the
Commerce Clause.1 9  Professor Epstein derived most of his
contemporaneous evidence of meaning from the constitutional
text.20 In United States v. Lopez,21 Justice Clarence Thomas
weighed in on this side, as did an article by Professor Raoul
Berger. 22 Justice Thomas and Professor Berger went beyond the
text to cite prior and contemporaneous evidence of the ordinary
lay (non-legal) meaning of "commerce," much of it gleaned from
eighteenth century dictionaries. 23
In 2001, Professor Randy Barnett published the results of a
survey of appearances of "commerce" in various eighteenth
century sources: lay dictionaries, the debates at the 1787 federal
convention, the debates in the state ratifying conventions, and in
the Federalist Papers.24 He concluded that the word was used
almost exclusively in the sense of exchange/economic intercourse.
17 See Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 17-21 (claiming that
commerce includes "all human interactions"); Pushaw, Methods, supra note 2, at
1186 (claiming that commerce includes marketplace activities, such as production
and compensated services); Nelson & Pushaw, Critique, supra note 2, at 696-98
(claiming that commerce includes marketplace activities, such as production and
compensated services).
18 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 107-08 (stating that commerce includes "all forms
of intercourse in the affairs of life").
19 See Epstein, supra note 2, at 1389 (stating that commerce is more in line with
notions of trade than other activities).
20 See id. at 1393-99 (discussing textual and structural interpretations of the
Commerce Clause). Professor Epstein also examined subsequent court decisions. See
id. at 1399-1450 (providing an analysis of various court decisions and their impact
on the commerce power).
21 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
22 See id. at 585-88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the historical meaning
of the term "commerce"); Berger, supra note 2, at 702-03 (explaining that the term
"commerce" historically meant "trade"); cf. Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda's Thumb:
The Modest and Mercantilist Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 2-4 (2004) (concluding that the original definition of
"commerce" was narrow, but that the subsequent "evolution" in the Commerce
Clause has been necessary).
23 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring); Berger, supra note 2,
at 702-03.
24 See Barnett, Original, supra note 2, at 113-25.
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In 2003, he added a tally of all appearances of "commerce" in the
Pennsylvania Gazette (Benjamin Franklin's newspaper) during
the period 1728-1800. He found that the Crosskey meaning of
"all gainful economic activity" was rare, and that "commerce"
almost always signified exchange to the exclusion of other
economic activities: "[I]t is impossible here [he wrote] to convey
the overwhelming consistency of the usage of 'commerce' to refer
to trading activity (especially shipping and foreign trade) without
listing one example after another."25 In 2002, Professors Pushaw
and Nelson published an article contradicting some of the
findings in the first Barnett study. 26 In 2003, Professor Pushaw
developed his case yet further.27
The post-New Deal Supreme Court has not amended its
earlier, narrow definition of the word "commerce,"28 but it
repeatedly has sustained regulation of matters outside that
definition by implicitly or explicitly enlisting the Necessary and
Proper Clause.29 The Court's view of the Necessary and Proper
Clause is that the Clause provides Congress with an additional
source of power by which Congress may govern conduct
"substantially affecting" mercantile activities. The Justices' most
recent-and clearest-statement of this view appears in
Gonzales v. Raich,30 where the majority explicitly relied on the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 31 and Justice Scalia reinforced
that reasoning in a concurring opinion.3 2
25 Barnett, New, supra note 2, at 858.
26 See generally Nelson & Pushaw, Critique, supra note 2 (taking issue with
Professor Barnett's reading of some of the evidence).
27 See Pushaw, Methods, supra note 2, at 1199-1201.
28 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (identifying the control
of prices at which commodities are bought and sold as regulation of commerce);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (stating that "manufacture is not of
itself interstate commerce").
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Necessary and Proper Clause reads, "To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Id.; see,
e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124 (accepting limitations of production as an
"'appropriate means to the attainment of [the] legitimate end'" of regulating prices
(quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942))).
30 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
31 125 S. Ct. at 2198-99.
32 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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II. THE EFFECT OF NEW NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
SCHOLARSHIP
For many years, the precise function of the Necessary and
Proper Clause remained a mystery among modern constitutional
commentators and judges. 33 In the vale of uncertainty, one could
credibly guess that it expanded an otherwise-narrow Commerce
Power, as the Court did in Raich. Recently, however, the original
meaning of the Clause has come to light, and the results suggest
quite a different interpretation. 34
The Constitution's drafters were firm believers in an "agency
theory" of government. The constitutional structure of
congressional powers reflects that belief. Article I, Section 8 in
general-and most particularly the Necessary and Proper
Clause-tracks the structure of eighteenth century agency
documents, especially powers of attorney.35  Under then-
prevailing law, express powers set forth in such agency
instruments carried with them (unless disclaimed) various
incidental powers.36 Incidental powers enabled the agent to
engage in subordinate activities absolutely necessary, reasonably
necessary, or both customary and convenient for exercising the
principal powers. A modern analogue appears in the Supreme
Court's 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 37 in which the Court
held that congressional authorization of the President to conduct
a war on terror carried with it authority to undertake actions
"incident" to war: those "necessary and appropriate"-implied in
33 See Mark A. Graber, Unnecessary and Unintelligible, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
167, 167 (1995) (calling the Clause "unintelligible").
34 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 208-14 (2003) (providing analysis of the Clause's
historical meanings and their implication); Epstein, supra note 2, at 1397-98; Gary
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 326-34
(1993) (analyzing the historical meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the
effect of a jurisdictional interpretation of the Clause on constitutional law). The
conclusions stated in the text are heavily documented in Natelson, Necessary and
Proper, supra note 2.
35 See Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2, at 267-76; see also 2
ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 148 (reporting James Iredell as likening the Constitution to
'a great power of attorney").
36 See Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2, at 277-84.
37 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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warfare by agreement and practice-such as detention of enemy
combatants. 38
Eighteenth century scriveners, like scriveners today,
frequently inserted in legal instruments language that had no
substantive force of its own. In particular, they commonly added
references to incidents that, if not referred to, would follow in any
event from the grant of the principal. Lord Coke had said of such
wording, "expressio eorum quae tacit6 insunt nihil operatur"-the
expression of those things that are silently inherent has no legal
effect-and had noted that despite its lack of substantive effect,
inserting such language was sometimes good practice.3 9
To alert parties to existing law and forestall later quibbles
about the extent of agency authority, scriveners often placed in
agency and trust documents language signaling the existence of
incidental powers. The Necessary and Proper Clause was based
on one of several common phrases used for this purpose. 40
38 Id. at 518.
39 Boroughe's Case, (1596) 4 Co. Rep. 72b, 73b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1043, 1044 (K.B.)
(reporter's commentary).
The 3d point (the great doubt of the case) which was resolved was, that in
this case the patentee ought to (a) demand the rent upon the land; and
their principal reason was grounded upon a rule in law, sc. that the
expression of a clause which the law implies, works nothing, (b) expressio
eorum quae tacit6 insunt nihil operatur et expressa non prosunt quae non
expressa proderunt: and yet, as (c) Littleton saith, it is well done to put in
such clauses ....
Id. at 73b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 1044.
40 Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2, at 274-76 (setting forth
numerous examples).
Since the publication of that article, many other examples have come to light.
See, e.g., McKreth v. Fox, (1791) 4 Bro. P.C. 258, 266-67, 2 Eng. Rep. 175, 180-81
(H.L.) (summarizing a private trust deed with similar language).
For statutory examples, see CHARLES NASON COLE, A COLLECTION OF LAWS 434
(1761) (granting commissioners of works "necessary or proper" powers). See also An
Act for Dividing and Inclosing Several Common Fields and Grounds, Within the
Manor of Fillingham, in the County of Lincoln 4 (granting commissioners "necessary
or proper" powers) (on file with the author); An Act for Dividing and Inclosing the
Open and Common Field... in the Township and Parish of Stretton 20 (granting
"convenient or necessary" powers) (on file with the author); 1768, 8 Geo. 3, c.16
(Eng.) (granting commissioners the power to make "proper" installations as they
may deem "necessary").
Moreover, orders from the House of Lords to lower courts frequently contained
necessary and proper language. See, e.g., John Earl of Buckingham v. Drury, (1762)
3 Bro. P.C. 492, 505, 1 Eng. Rep. 1454, 1462 (H.L.) ("[A]nd that the said court do give
all necessary and proper directions for carrying this judgment into execution."); West
v. Erisey, (1727) 1 Bro. P.C. 225, 233, 1 Eng. Rep. 530, 536 (H.L.) ("[A]nd the Court
of Exchequer was to give all necessary and proper directions for the making this
20061
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Conscious that some might otherwise quibble about the extent of
federal authority (particularly since the Articles of Confederation
had explicitly excluded implied powers), 41 the drafters of the
Constitution-as conscientious students of Coke-added their
own "necessary and proper" language.
In accordance with Coke's nihil operatur maxim, the
Necessary and Proper Clause, like a few other parts of the
Constitution, 42 was not a substantive grant, but only a rule of
construction-a restatement of existing law with no independent
legal effect. Indeed, the Necessary and Proper Clause was
represented and sold to the ratifying public on precisely this
basis. 43
The effect of these findings is as follows: If the Necessary
and Proper Clause adds nothing of substance to Congress'
authority, then the meaning of each federal power must be tested
by asking what that scope would be in absence of that Clause.
Thus, the scope of the Commerce Power becomes heavily
dependent on how one defines "commerce." The Crosskey
definition of "commerce" serves the goals of those who favor a
modern federal regulatory state,44 since it enables Congress to
regulate all gainful activity, even without resort to incidental
judgment effectual.").
41 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (1781) (limiting congressional
powers to those expressly granted).
42 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
On the Supremacy Clause, along with the Necessary and Proper Clause, as
merely declaratory rules of construction, see THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 158
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund
2001) (1788) ("[These clauses] are only declaratory of a truth, which would have
resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting
a federal government, and vesting it with certain specified powers.").
43 See Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2, at 292-314.
44 See, e.g., Pushaw, Methods, supra note 2, at 1201 ("Does anyone seriously
believe that Congress or the Court will, or should, dismantle the entire Commerce
Clause framework?"). Professor Pushaw also quotes Robert Bork to the effect that
"[iut appears that the American people would be overwhelmingly against such a
change." Id. at 1202 (quoting Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the
Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power To Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 849, 851 (2002)); cf. Nelson & Pushaw, Critique, supra note 2, at 699
(calling the Barnett thesis "radically destabilizing").
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powers. The narrower definition of commerce, however, coupled
with the correct interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, leaves Congress only with authority to regulate
commerce and with incidental authority over other subjects.
That incidental authority is not extensive, for the founders'
doctrine of incidental powers was fairly limited in scope.
Incidental powers could be used only to serve the principal
grant,45 and by definition, an incident was not something discrete
from nor of equal dignity with the principal. 46 For example, a
bailiff given authority to manage an estate could make short-
term leases, but did not thereby obtain the power to convey a
freehold.47
This understanding poses few problems for pre-New Deal
jurisprudence, which focused largely on distinguishing
permissible regulation of interstate commerce and permissible
incidental regulation from impermissible governance of other
activities. 48 But it is inconsistent with much of the post-New
Deal jurisprudence involving the Commerce Power. Regulation
of massive and discrete economic categories such as
manufacturing, mining, and agriculture seems to be much more
than a mere incident of overseeing mercantile trade.49
I think it is fair to say that thus far proponents of the narrow
interpretation of "commerce" have had the better of the semantic
argument. 50 My own immersion in the rhetoric of the founding
45 Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 358-59 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.) (stating that Congress may not adopt legislation unrelated to an enumerated
power upon the "pretext" that it serves an enumerated power).
46 JACOB, supra note 2 (defining "incident" as "a Thing necessarily depending
upon, appertaining to, or following another that is more worthy or principal"). See
generally Natelson, Tempering, supra note 2 (documenting from founding-era
common law the contemporaneous limitations on incidental powers).
47 See 3 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 538-40
(1747) (listing powers within and without the implied authority of the bailiff of a
manor).
48 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1938) (distinguishing
commerce from mining); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935) (using direct and indirect effects on commerce for distinguishing what is
and isn't incident to the commerce power); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922)
(determining what activities are and are not in the "flow" of commerce to determine
if they are incidental to the commerce power); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1 (1895) (distinguishing commerce from manufacture); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding that navigation was understood by the founding
generation as part of commerce).
49 See Natelson, Tempering, supra note 2.
50 I have been able to find no response to Barnett, New, supra note 2, which
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era seems to confirm Professor Barnett's conclusion that in
common discourse, and particularly in the public debates over
the Constitution, "commerce" nearly always meant "exchange,"51
and that proffered evidence for a broader non-legal meaning
usually dissolves under scrutiny.52  Perhaps, however, the
Crosskey interpretation of the Commerce Clause can be saved by
shifting the nature of the inquiry. Previously, the disputants
have focused on contemporaneous evidence of the ordinary lay
meaning of "commerce."53 Perhaps they should have focused on
the legal meaning of the word.
This suggestion gains force from the fact that the
Constitution is not a lay document but a legal document.
Accordingly, almost two-thirds of the delegates to the convention
cites over 1500 instances of the use of the word "commerce" in a leading American
newspaper spanning over seven decades. Professors Nelson and Pushaw did respond
to some of Professor Barnett's readings in Barnett, Original, supra note 2. See
Pushaw, Critique, supra note 2, at 705-11. But they concede that "[tlhe core
meaning of 'commerce' is, and always has been, the sale of goods." Id. at 705 (quoting
Nelson and Pushaw, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 9 n.37). Since all parties were
seeking the usual and ordinary meaning of the word, rather than just some possible
meanings, this seems a serious concession.
51 See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 132 (discussing the widely held view
among the founding generation that societies evolved into different stages according
to their dominant economic activity: (1) hunting and gathering, (2) herding,
(3) tillage agriculture, (4) commerce, and (5) manufacturing, thereby limiting
"commerce" to only one of those gainful activities).
While Professor Akhil Amar is correct that the term "commerce" could mean
intercourse of all kinds, AMAR, supra note 2, at 107, the founding generation did not
use the word that way in speaking of the federal government's prospective powers,
see generally Barnett, Original, supra note 2, at 114-24 (summarizing results of
survey of every appearance of "commerce" in the federal and state conventions and
in the Federalist Papers); infra Part VI.
52 For example, I examined uses of "commerce" in an Internet version of ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776). Although this work is sometimes cited as illustrating an expansive meaning
of "commerce," see, e.g., Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 14 n.51, 15
n.55, 16 n.58, my word-search for "commerce" on the site resulted overwhelmingly in
the narrow, mercantile definition. The curious reader can check for himself or
herself. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), available at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca
/-econ/ugcm/3113/smith/wealth.
53 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); W. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 55-57; Berger, supra note 2, at 702-03;
Nelson & Pushaw, Critique, supra note 2, at 700 (arguing that lay meaning should
control). Professors Barnett and Epstein have provided extensive evidence of legal
meaning, but only beginning in 1824. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 1399-1454.
Professor Crosskey did include a short treatment of the probable meaning among
lawyers of the phrase "among the States." 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 2, at 77-83.
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that prepared it were lawyers. 54 The initial draft was prepared
by the convention's Committee of Detail, four of whose five
members were eminent attorneys. 55 The author of the final
version, Gouverneur Morris, was a lawyer.56 Even most of the
major figures who represented the meaning of the Constitution to
the ratifying public were lawyers. These figures included all of
the principal federalist essayists except James Madison and
Tench Coxe, 57 and nearly all the federalist floor managers and
principal spokesmen at the state ratifying conventions. Even a
fair number of the anti-federalist leaders, notably Patrick Henry
and the putative authors of the "Brutus" and "Federal Farmer"
essays, were lawyers. 58 Moreover, the delegates to the ratifying
conventions and participating members of the public knew that if
the Constitution were approved it would be construed by legally-
trained judges and by public officials, who would be guided by
lawyers. 59
When the public ratifies a legal document it does so in the
expectation that the document will contain legal terms of art.
One could make a case, therefore, that the crucial meaning of
"commerce" is not its ordinary meaning but its legal meaning.
III. SOURCES OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LEGAL MEANING
Modern citations to eighteenth century legal sources tend to
54 MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 220 (stating that thirty-four of the fifty-five
delegates were lawyers).
55 The lawyers were James Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth, John Rutledge, and
Edmund Randolph. The non-lawyer was Nathaniel Gorham. See Natelson, Necessary
and Proper, supra note 2, at 269-71. Wilson, Ellsworth, and Rutledge all later
served on the Supreme Court. Randolph was the first attorney general of the United
States. See id.
56 RICHARD BROOKHISER, GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR
MORRIS-THE RAKE WHO WROTE THE CONSTITUTION 15-16 (2003).
57 See Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 479-80. This source lists all the
principal essayists except John Dickinson, who also was a lawyer. On Dickinson, see
MILTON E. FLOWER, JOHN DICKINSON: CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTIONARY (1983).
Dickinson clerked in a Philadelphia law office, see id. at 10, before studying at
London's Middle Temple, see id. at 18-19.
58 The most commonly suggested author of "Essays of Brutus" is Robert Yates of
New York, ESSAYS OF BRUTUS (1787-1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 358 (HERBERT J. STORING ED., 1981), and of the "Federal Farmer,"
Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, see FORREST MCDONALD, EMPIRE AND NATION ix-x
(Forrest McDonald ed., Liberty Fund 1999) (1962).
59 See, e.g., 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 535 (reproducing an
anti-federalist tract setting forth hypothetical future judicial opinion construing the
General Welfare Clause).
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be dominated by Blackstone's Commentaries60 with an occasional
reference to Edward Coke. 61 But the corpus of contemporaneous
legal sources was far richer than that.
There were dozens of volumes of reported cases,
supplemented from time to time by the reporters' own
commentary. These volumes were compiled either by the
reporters themselves or by others, relying on the reporters'
notes. 62 Deep study of such material was a central feature of the
founders' legal education. John Dickinson, for one, related in a
series of letters from London's Middle Temple 63 his immersion in
the reports of Coke,64 Edmund Plowden, 65 William Salkeld,66 and
Peyton Ventris. 67
60 On Blackstone, see Wilfrid Prest, Blackstone, Sir William (1723-1780), Legal
Writer and Judge, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (2004-05),
http://www.oxforddnb.com [hereinafter BIOGRAPHY DICTIONARY] (click on
"Subscribers enter here" in the upper right hand corner; if necessary, enter user
name and password; type the name "Blackstone, William" in the query box).
61 On Coke, see Alan D. Boyer, Coke, Sir Edward (1552-1634), Lawyer, Legal
Writer and Politician, in BIOGRAPHY DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (click on
"Subscribers enter here" in the upper right hand corner; if necessary, enter user
name and password; type the name "Coke, Edward" in the query box).
A search of the Westlaw "Journal and Law Review" (JLR) database on October 7,
2006 using the query, "'william blackstone' Is commentaries" resulted in 4844
documents identified. A search on the same date using the query "'Edward Coke'/s
institutes" resulted in 514 documents. See infra note 89 (documenting the neglect of
other crucial authors).
62 See generally JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE REPORTERS ARRANGED AND
CHARACTERIZED WITH INCIDENTAL REMARKS 1-4 (Boston, Soule and Bugbee, 4th
ed., rev. and enlarged 1882) (discussing the biographies, methodology, and relative
reputations of the various English case reporters).
63 See H. Trevor Colbourn ed., A Pennsylvania Farmer at the Court of King
George: John Dickinson's London Letters, 1754-1756, PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY,
at 417 (1962) (setting forth the content of Dickinson's letters from London to his
parents). His references are to Coke, id. at 257, 422, 441, 451, Plowden, id. at 257,
423, 451, Salkeld, id. at 451, and Ventris, id. at 451. He also mentions Littleton-
perhaps Coke's commentary on his work. Id. at 423.
64 On Coke, see supra note 61.
65 See Christopher W. Brooks, Plowden, Edmund (c. 1518-1585), Law Reporter,
in BIOGRAPHY DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (click on "Subscribers enter here" in the
upper right hand corner; if necessary, enter user name and password; type the name
"Plowden, Edmund" in the Query box).
66 See W. R. Williams, Salkeld, William (1671-1715), Serjeant-at-Law and Law
Reporter, in BIOGRAPHY DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (click on "Subscribers enter
here" in the upper right hand corner; if necessary, enter user name and password;
type the name "Salkeld, William" in the query box).
67 See Paul D. Halliday, Ventris, Sir Peyton (1645-1691), Judge and Politician,
in BIOGRAPHY DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (click on "Subscribers enter here" in the
upper right hand corner; if necessary, enter user name and password; type the name
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Seven of the fifty-five delegates to the federal convention had
been trained in London's Inns of Court.6 So had a significant
portion of the American bar,69 including several important
ratification figures who did not attend the federal convention.70
As students, they had listened in the audience as the royal
justices heard, decided, and explained current controversies.
Some had no doubt seen, and everyone had heard of, the great
Lord Mansfield, the chief justice whose work in the years
immediately preceding (1756-88) had gone far toward perfecting
the English law of commerce. 7'
One did not have to be educated in the Inns of Court to
benefit from the contemporaneous outpouring of law books. Giles
Jacobs' New Law-Dictionary,72 a popular work in American law
libraries, 73 contained so much exposition on the topics it covered
that it seems more a treatise than a dictionary. Yet Jacob's
offering was only one of several competing law dictionaries on the
market.7 4  There were other overviews of the legal system
available as well: besides the Institutes of Coke 75 and that
"Ventris, Peyton" in the query box).
68 See E. ALFRED JONES, AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE INNS OF COURT 21-22,
61-63, 102, 104, 134-36, 170-71 (1924) (including John Blair, John Dickinson,
William Houston, Jared Ingersoll, William Livingston, Charles Pinckney, and
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney).
69 See CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 18 (H. Fertig 1966)
(1911) (stating that between 1750 and 1775, four colonies, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and Virginia, had nearly 150 lawyers educated at the Inns).
70 See, e.g., id. at 45-47 (citing Henry Lee, a federalist speaker at the Virginia
ratifying convention); id. at 412 (listing Alexander White, author of one of the
published enumerations of state powers and a leading federalist spokesman in
Virginia).
71 MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 114-15 (describing Lord Mansfield's
jurisprudence and the American reaction); see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (taking judicial notice of the founding generation's
knowledge of a leading Mansfield decision).
72 JACOB, DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
73 On the popularity of various works, including Jacob's Dictionary, see
JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 59-64. For an early American citation, see Giles v.
Mallecote, 2 Va. Col. Dec. B71, B74 (Gen. Ct. 1738).
74 See, e.g., THOMAS BLOUNT, A LAW-DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY (3d ed. 1717)
(1670); JOHN COWELL, A LAW DICTIONARY OR THE INTERPRETER (1607);
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2; WILLIAM RASTALL, LES TERMES DE LA LEY (mult. eds.);
AN ATTORNEY AT LAW, THE STUDENT'S LAW DICTIONARY; OR COMPLEAT ENGLISH
LAW-EXPOSITOR (London, E. and R. Nutt and R. Gosling (Assigns of Edward Sayer,
Esq.) (1740) [hereinafter STUDENT'S LAW DICTIONARY].
75 See COKE, supra note 2.
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relative latecomer, William Blackstone, 76 there were treatises by
Thomas Wood, 77 Henry Finch,78 and John Fortescue. 79 There
were tracts focused on special areas, including commercial law. 8
There was an abundance of form-books. 81 There were competing
multi-volume "abridgments" and "digests" that organized all of
English law by topic, crisply summarizing statutes and case
holdings. The best known were by Matthew Bacon,8 2 John
Comyns, 83 Knightly D'Anvers, 84 William Nelson, 85 and, most
famously, Charles Viner.8 6
This flood gushed out of Britain and into America.8 7 To be
sure, books were expensive, and many a country lawyer was
without any of them, but the lawyers among the leading
Founders were not in that category. Moreover, works that seem
obscure today were not so then. One survey of eighteenth
century American law libraries found more copies of D'Anvers'
Abridgment than copies of Blackstone.88 Modern constitutional
76 See Wilfred Prest, Blackstone, Sir William (1723-1780), Legal Writer and
Judge, in BIOGRAPHY DICTIONARY, supra note 60, at 5 (noting that Blackstone's
Commentaries were not published until 1765-69).
77 THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1754).
78 HENRY FINCH, LAW OR DISCOURSE THEREOF (August M. Kelley Publishers
1759).
79 JOHN FORTESQUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE (John Selden ed. 1737).
80 See, e.g., BEAWES, supra note 2; MOLLOY, supra note 2.
81 See, e.g., GILBERT HORSMAN, PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING (1785) (3 vols.);
GILES JACOB, THE ACCOMPLISHED CONVEYANCER (1716). For the relevance of
conveyancing books to constitutional law, see Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra
note 2, at 273-76.
82 BACON, supra note 2.
83 COMYNS, supra note 2.
84 KNIGHTLY D'ANVERS, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF THE COMMON LAW (3 vols.)
(1705-37).
85 WILLIAM NELSON, -AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE COMMON LAW (3 vols.) (1725-27).
86 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY (1743 ff) (23
vols.). Viner subsequently endowed the Vinerian Chair in Common Law at Oxford
under the condition that William Blackstone be the first occupant. He thus made
Blackstone's Commentaries possible. On Viner's life, see David Ibbetson, Viner,
Charles (bap. 1678, d. 1756), Legal Writer and University Benefactor, in BIOGRAPHY
DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (click on "Subscribers enter here" in the upper right
corner; if necessary, enter user name and password; type the name "Viner, Charles"
in the query box). On the influence of his "Abridgment," see W. S. HOLDSWORTH,
CHARLES VINER AND THE ABRIDGMENTS OF ENGLISH LAW (1923).
87 See generally JOHNSON, supra note 2.
88 See id. at 59. Multiple copies of D'Anvers' work also showed up in WILLIAM
HAMILTON BRYSON, CENSUS OF LAW BOOKS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 46 (1978).
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commentary has tended to neglect most of this material,8 9 but we
shall take account of it here.
IV. Focus OF THIS STUDY
Was the legal meaning of "commerce" different from the lay
meaning? To find out, I examined the legal works used most
commonly by the founding generation. The collections I accessed
were in the Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford,
England; in Oxford's Codrington Library; and in the library at
the Middle Temple in London, one of England's Inns of Court.90
The works examined included all available legal dictionaries,
abridgments, "institutes," and commercial treatises. In addition,
using the Justis database of English Reports (Full Reprint), I
identified every use of the term "commerce," both in English and
in Law French, in English cases reported during the sixteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. 91 Similarly, using the
Westlaw database, I identified all uses of "commerce" in
American cases before 1790.
The process was a lengthy one, but the findings may be
summarized quickly: Changing the terms of the debate from the
lay meaning to legal meaning of "commerce" makes no difference.
In legal discourse the term was almost always a. synonym for
exchange, traffic, or intercourse. When used economically, it
referred to mercantile activities: buying, selling, and certain
89 For example, as of October 7, 2006 there were only 50 articles in the entire
Westlaw "journals and law reviews" (JLR) database referencing any works in Giles
Jacob's copious bibliography. Only some of these were on constitutional law topics.
They were overwhelmingly citations to Jacob's law dictionary, rather than to his
many other works. At least Jacob fared better than his competitor Thomas Blount,
whose dictionary garnered only 15 citations in the same database. The query
"Edmund Plowden"-an author the founding generation considered in the same
general rank as Coke and Blackstone-produced only 34 entries. Even more sparse
were citations to Knightly D'Anvers' popular (although incomplete) Abridgment.
There were only two-both by me.
The most astonishing statistic is that Charles Viner's Abridgment-the most
complete and celebrated of his day-was cited in only 38 articles. Of those, I was
responsible for two.
Compare these statistics with the very heavy modern reliance on Blackstone and
Coke. See supra note 61.
90 Although almost all of this material was available in America, England was
the most convenient locale for examining it in places relatively close together.
91 A search for the English/French word "commerce" in Professor David J.
Seipp's data base covering the Year Books (for cases decided in 1535 and before)
yielded no results. See http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/yearbooks/ (select
"Search Year Books").
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closely-related conduct, such as navigation and commercial
finance. It very rarely encompassed other gainful economic
activities, and I found no clear case of it encompassing all gainful
economic activities. If the excerpts and footnotes in the following
pages seem repetitive at times, it is because the sources repeat
the same general meanings-even the same specific definitions-
over and over again. They must have been burned into the
minds of every founding-era lawyer who had even a passing
interest in the subject.
V. THE MEANING OF "COMMERCE" IN THE FOUNDERS'
LEGAL SOURCES
A. Cases Reports
English Reports (Full Reprint) reproduces reports of English
cases from 1220 to 1865. Reproduction of the nominate reports
(those by named reporters, such as Ventris, Plowden, or Salkeld)
for the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries is
essentially complete. Those cases are found in about 50
volumes.92 As noted above, I used a searchable database to
identify all uses of the word "commerce," both in English and in
Law French, in those volumes. 93  "Commerce" appeared
approximately 473 times, of which a small number were part of
proper names. 94 In addition, there were six uses of the Latin
term commercium, a word closely identified-and to all
appearances interchangeable-with its English derivative. 95 To
92 These are volumes 1-3, 21-29, 72-100, 123-125, 145, 161, 167, 168, and 170.
There are also some seventeenth and eighteenth century cases in volume 36. There
may be minor spillage of such cases into other volumes, and some of the volumes
listed above also include cases decided after 1800 (which are not used in this article).
93 Because I admitted cases from throughout the eighteenth century, a few cited
in this article were decided shortly after the Constitution was ratified. I generally
give very little weight to post-ratification evidence, see Natelson, Necessary and
Proper, supra note 2, at 247-48, but the few post-ratification holdings cited here are
merely confirmatory of the vast bulk of prior cases. Cf. id. at 248 (explaining that I
cite to post-ratification material when it confirms other uncontradicted evidence).
Moreover, it is unlikely that the English legal understanding of "commerce" was
altered because the United States ratified a Constitution that contained the word.
94 The figure is "approximately" 473 because there are occasional misspellings
in the data base. I tried to catch these, but may have missed a few. The proper
names included the French Code of Commerce, a Chambre of Commerce, and a ship
by that name.
95 See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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these I added 25 pre-1790 American cases containing the term
"commerce;" none of the American cases included the Latin
equivalent. In both English and American cases, the terms were
sprinkled throughout court opinions and the arguments of
counsel. I did not distinguish those uses, because I was trying to
ascertain the meanings of the term in legal circles generally.
I found that in the case law, judges and counsel used the
words commercium and "commerce" in ways similar to those that
Professor Barnett identified in lay discourse. The Latin term,
which always carries a sense of traffic or exchange, 96 always was
used that way in the cases-particularly being applied to
merchants and their financial instruments.9 7  The more
96 See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 2. All of the definitions of commercium partake of
the meaning of traffic and exchange. They include:
(1) "Commercial intercourse, trade, traffic, commerce,"
(2) "The right to trade as merchants, a mercantile right,"
(3) "An article of traffic, merchandise, wares,"
(4) "[I]ntercourse, communication, correspondence, fellowship,"
(5) "[F]orbidden intercourse, illicit commerce ... stupri" [a word used of
sexual trangression]
Id. at 378.
97 See Bromwich v. Lloyd, (1704) 2 Lut. App.1582, 1585, 125 Eng. Rep. 870, 871
(K.B.) (using commercium in a promissory note case); Woolvil v. Young, (1697) 5
Mod. 367, 367, 87 Eng. Rep. 710, 710 (K.B.) ("Every man is negotians [sic] in the
kingdom; and if the plaintiff would have brought his case within the custom of
merchants, he ought to have said commercium habentes, or have shewn that the bill
signed was a bill of exchange. It is true, in the case of Sarsfeild v. Witherly (a), the
declaration was, that the defendant Witherly was residens et negotians at London,
&c. without saying commercium habens; but it appeared upon the whole frame of the
declaration that it was a bill of exchange.") (emphasis in original); Williams v.
Williams, (1693) Carth. 269, 269-70, 90 Eng. Rep. 759, 759 (K.B.) (reciting in a
promissory note case, "That the City of London is an ancient city, quodq; habetur &
a tempore cujus contrarium memoria hominum non existit habebatur quaedam
antiqua & laudabilis consuetudo inter mercatores & al' personas commercium
exercen .... Cumque etiam quidam Joh'es Pullin existen' persona quae per viam
Merchandisand' commercium habuit, &c....," that is: "in which [city] prevails and
from a time the mind of man running not the contrary has prevailed a certain old
and praiseworthy custom among merchants and other persons engaged in
commerce .... And also a certain John Pullin, an existing person who carried on
commerce in the matter of merchandizing, etc."); Cramlington v. Evans, (1690) 2
Vent. 296, 300, 86 Eng. Rep. 449, 452 (Exch.) ("[Fluit quaedam consuet. int.
mercator.& al. personas infra hoc regn. Angl. residen. & commerc. habentes usitat. &
approbat. quod si aliquis mercator vel al. person. infra hoc regn. Angl' residen. fecerit
aliquam billa [sic] excambii secund. usum mercator ..... that is, "[T]here was a
certain custom among merchants and other persons residing and carrying on
commerce in this Kingdom of England, used and approved, that if some merchant or
other person residing in this Kingdom of England shall have made some bill of
exchange according to the practice of merchants .. "); Gull v. Carswell, (1709)
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frequently used English word had, with rare exceptions, a similar
meaning. It encompassed the buying and selling of items created
by others, 98 together with certain closely allied activities.
"Commerce" embraced the actions of merchants, 99  factors
(commodity brokers), 100  carriers, 101  traffickers with foreign
Burrell. 295, 295, 167 Eng. Rep. 580, 580 (Adm.) (referring to commercium with
India).
Translations in this article are by the author.
98 See Waddill v. Chamberlayne, 2 Va. Col. Dec. B45, B46 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1735)
(referring to commerce as buying and selling); Luke v. Bridges, (1700) Prec. Ch. 146,
149, 24 Eng. Rep. 70, 71 (Ch.) (referring to commerce in securities); Evans v.
Cramlington, (1687) Skin. 264, 265, 90 Eng. Rep. 120, 121 (Ch.) ("[C]ommerce is a
word of too large signification, and may comprehend pedlers [sic], or they who sell
corn, &c .... "); Anonymous, 3 Salk. 157, 157, 91 Eng. Rep. 750, 750 (court and date
not given) ("Permutatio, vicina est empitoni, but exchanges were the original and
natural way of commerce, precedent to buying, for there was no buying till money
was invented now, in exchanging, both parties are buyers and sellers, and both
equally warrant .. ").
9 See Apthorp v. Backus, 1 Am. Dec. 26, 30 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1788) ("A state may
exclude aliens from acquiring property within it of any kind, as its safety or policy
may direct: as England has done, with regard to real property, saving that in favor
of commerce alien merchants may hold leases of houses and stores .. "); Vallezjo v.
Wheeler, (1774) Lofft. 631, 635, 98 Eng. Rep. 836, 838 (K.B.) ("The author whom I
shall beg leave to cite next is Savary, who says, 'Barratry of the master, in the
language of commerce and merchandize, means the larcinies [sic], disguising and
alteration of merchandizes which master or crew may occasion; and generally all
kinds of cheating, tricks and malversations [sic], which they often employ to deceive
the merchant, freighter and others who are interested in the vessel.' "); id. at 638, 98
Eng. Rep. at 840 ("In Postlethwaite's Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, which I
understand to be generally esteemed one of the best books upon the subject, by
gentlemen conversant in mercantile transactions .... ); Hussey v. Jacob, (1703) 2
Raym. Ld. 93, 93-94, 92 Eng. Rep. 582, 583 (K.B.) (referring to "merchants, and
other persons using commerce"); Bellasis v. Hester, (1697) 3 Raym. Ld. 336, 92 Eng.
Rep. 719 (K.B.) (referring to "persons in the way of merchandising, trading and
using commerce within this realm"); Tuerloote v. Morrison, (1611) Yelverton 198,
198, 80 Eng. Rep. 130, 131 (K.B.) (finding merchant successful in suit for slander
because protection warranted by public needs for commerce); Le Case del Union del
Realm, d'Escose, ove Angleterre, (1606) Moo. K.B. 790, 72 Eng. Rep. 908 (K.B.)
(referring to "Commerce and Merchandizing by Merchants of both Nations"); Pippon
v. Pippon, (1744) Ridg. T. H. 165, 169, 27 Eng. Rep. 791, 793 (Ch.) ("It would affect
the commerce of this kingdom to a very great degree; merchants abroad have debts
here, and if those should be distributed according to the laws of England, it would be
a most mischievous thing to the commerce of this country .... ) (emphasis in
original); also reported sub nom. at Pipon v. Pipon, Amb. 799, 801, 27 Eng. Rep. 507,
508 (Ch.) ("[I]t could not be done, and would be extremely mischievous, and greatly
affect the commerce of these kingdoms; no foreign merchant would know how to deal
here .... ").
100 See Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, (1779) 1 Dougl. 119, 130, 99 Eng. Rep. 80, 87
(K.B.) (corn factors); Farrington v. Lee, (1677) 1 Mod. 269, 269, 86 Eng. Rep. 873,
873 (C.P.) (factors who work for merchants involved in "trade and commerce"); see
also Greenway v. Barker, (1612) Godb. 260, 261 78 Eng. Rej. 151, 152 (K.B.)
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nations, 10 2 and consignees. 10 3 The courts connected shippers and
navigators with "commerce," and regulation of navigation was
closely associated with regulation of commerce t 4-which shows
(explaining why there is a court of admiralty). Specifically, the court in Greenway
stated the following:
A mans [sic] life is in danger by reason of traffique, and merchants venture
all their estates; and therefore it is but reasonable that they have a place
for the trial of contracts made upon the sea by them or their
factors.... And so long as there hath been any commerce and traffique by
this kingdom, so long there hath been a Court of Admiralty.
Id.
101 See Francis v. Wyatt, (1764) 1 Black.W. 483, 485, 96 Eng. Rep. 279, 280
(K.B.) (characterizing a public livery stable as a "branch of commerce").
102 See The Erstern, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 34, 35-36 (Fed. App. Mass. 1782) (referring
to foreign trade as "commerce"); Collingwood v. Pace, (1661) Bridg. 0. 410, 434, 124
Eng. Rep. 661, 675 (C.P.) ("So that, by the common law, a merchant might go beyond
the sea, without licence, for the business of traffic and merchandize; and a merchant,
who is beyond the seas upon traffic and merchandize, is supposed to have animum
revertendi; and his case (it being pro bono publico to go beyond the sea for traffic and
commerce) is like the case of an ambassador, who being beyond sea only on his
master's errand, his children are natural born subjects.") (footnote omitted); Bruse v.
Harcourt, (1709) Park. 274, 274, 145 Eng. Rep. 778, 778 (Exch.) (reporting on a
seizure of French wine, as forfeited by statute "for prohibiting all trade and
commerce with France"); Tarleton v. M'Gawley, (1793) Peake. 270, 272, 170 Eng.
Rep. 153, 154 (K.B.) ("Law, for the defendant, contended that the plaintiffs being
engaged in a [foreign] trade which by the law of that country was illicit, could not
support an action for an interruption of such illicit commerce ... "); Boucher v.
Lawson, (1734) Cas. t. Hard. 85, 87, 95 Eng. Rep. 53, 54 (K.B); also reported at Cun.
144, 146, 94 Eng. Rep. 1116, 1117 (Ch.) (referring to illegal export of gold "illicit
commerce"); Eyre v. Eyre, (1750) 2 Ves. Sen. 86, 86, 28 Eng. Rep. 56, 57 (Ch.)
(counsel arguing that a ruling he opposed would "hurt commerce" with India); Blad
v. Bamfield, (1674) 3 Swans. 604, 605-06 (app.), 36 Eng. Rep. 992, 992 (Ch.)
(containing two appearances of the word, both as synonyms for "trade"). Thus, the
foreign ministers who negotiated commercial treaties sometimes were referred to as
"agent of commerce." See, e.g., Triquet v. Bath, (1764) 3 Burr. 1478, 1480-81, 97
Eng. Rep. 936, 937-38 (K.B. 1764) (Mansfield, C.J.).
103 See Golden v. Manning, (1773) 3 Wils. K.B. 429, 433, 95 Eng. Rep. 1138,
1141 (K.B.).
Serjeant Glynn & contrA, for the defendants, contended. That when they
received the goods at their warehouse in Birmingham, they only undertook
to carry them from thence to their warehouse in London and no further,
and that it was the duty of Ireland the consignee, upon the arrival of the
goods at London, to have then sent and inquired for the same, according to
the advice thereof which he must have received from his correspondent the
plaintiff at Birmingham, as is the constant and invariable custom and
usage amongst merchants and traders, both in respect to foreign and
inland trade and commerce.
Id.
104 See Attorney-General v. Richards, (1795) 2 Anst. 603, 607, 145 Eng. Rep.
980, 981 (Ch.) ("So in the case of The City of Bristol v. Morgan, cited in Lord Hale's
treatise De Portibus Maris, p. 81. The bill stated the benefit of navigable rivers for
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that Chief Justice Marshall's view of the matter in Gibbons v.
Ogden °5 was solidly supported by precedent. This also answers
a question Professor Mark R. Killenbeck's posed a few years ago:
How could the First Congress think it could regulate in detail the
conduct of sailors unless it had adopted a "substantial effects"
view of the commerce power? 10 6 That answer is that there was no
need for a "substantial effects" test, for regulating navigation had
long been part of regulating commerce.
commerce, and the right to have all purprestures therein abated."); Penn v. Lord
Baltimore, (1750)1 Ves. Sen. 444, 454, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132, 1138 (Ch.) ("[T]he great
beneficial advantages, arising to the crown from settling, &c. is, that the navigation
and the commerce of this country is thereby improved."); Scot v. Schawrtz (1739), 2
Com. 677, 693, 92 Eng. Rep. 1265, 1272 (Exch.) ("[I]t would be almost impracticable,
and make commerce very hazardous, if every merchant was to search out the
nativity of every mariner whom he employed, and in case of mistake or
misinformation was to forfeit his ship and cargo."); Philips v. Baillie, (1784) 3 Dougl.
374, 376, 99 Eng. Rep. 703, 705 (K.B.) ("It is said in Beawes [a leading treatise],
that, 'even in times of peace, convoys are ordered by the Government, to guard and
defend our trading vessels from the assaults of pirates, or encroachers on our
commerce, more especially in our fisheries and other parts of the West Indies, where
they may be exposed to such attacks by commercial intruders.'"); Greenway v.
Barker's Case, (1613) Godb. 260, 261, 78 Eng. Rep. 151, 152 (C.P.) (identifying
commerce with admiralty).
Many American cases identify "commerce" with navigation, ships, and shipping.
See Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1, 1, 6-8, 16, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 19,
23-27, 31-32 (Fed. App. Pa 1781); Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F. Cas. 755, 756 (D. Pa.
1789) (No. 3,930); Rice v. The Polly and Kitty, 20 F. Cas. 666, 667 (D. Pa. 1789) (No.
11,754); Moran v. Baudin, 17 F. Cas. 721, 722 (D. Pa. 1788) (No. 9,785); The
Emperor, 15 F. Cas. 508, 508 (Adm. Pa. 1785); Gibbs v. The Two Friends, 10 F. Cas.
302, 303 (Adm. Pa. 1781) (No. 5,386); Canizares v. The Santissima Trinidad, 5 F.
Cas. 13, 16 (Adm. D. Pa 1788) (No. 2,383); Montgomery v. Wharton, 17 F. Cas. 645,
646 (Adm. Pa. 1780) (No. 9,737); Phile v. The Ship Anna, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 197, 198-
99, 201 (Ct. Com. P1. Pa. 1787); Harrison v. Sterett, 4 H.&McH. 540, 544 (Md. Prov.
1774); Flemming v. Ball, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 3, 4 (Super. Ct. 1784).
105 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).
All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word
"commerce," to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must
have been so understood, when the constitution was framed. The power
over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for
which the people of America adopted their government, and must have
been contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the word
in that sense, because all have understood it in that sense ....
Id.
106 See Mark R. Killenbeck, The Qualities of Completeness: More? or Less?, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1629, 1649-50 (1999). The answer is that Congress did not need a
"substantial effects" approach because the accepted legal doctrine was that
regulating navigation was part of regulating commerce.
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Legal professionals frequently coupled "commerce" with
"traffic," as in the phrase "traffic and commerce." 10 7  Less
commonly, they spoke of "commerce and intercourse." 10 8 The
most common phrase of this sort was "trade and commerce" 109-
an expression that also appeared in the Articles of
Confederation. 110
When used alone, "trade" sometimes had a wider meaning
than "commerce." This was particularly true in certain statutory
contexts, where Parliament had defined "trade" or "trader" in a
specific way. Thus, the bankruptcy statutes referred to a class of
"traders" that included some artificers.'11  Other statutes
regulated the practice of some "trades"-meaning occupations. 112
This occasionally-broader meaning of trade, however, seems
not to have spilled over very much to the word commerce.
Almost always, the meaning of that word was restricted to
exchange and its instrumentalities. Some potentially gainful
activities-such as gambling' 13 and operating the post office 1 4-
107 See Waller v. Travers, (1662) Hardr. 301, 303, 145 Eng. Rep. 467, 468 (Exch.)
("commerce and traffick"); Case of Mines, (1568) 1 P1. Com. 310, 316, 75 Eng. Rep.
472, 481 (Exch.) ("commerce and traffick"); Collingwood v. Pace, (1661) Bridg. 0.
410, 434, 124 Eng. Rep. 661, 675 (C.P.) ("it being pro bono publico to go beyond the
sea for traffic and commerce"); Le Case de Mixt Moneys, (1604) Dav. 18, 18, 80 Eng.
Rep. 507, 507 (P. C. [Ire.]) ("auters usant ascun traffique ou commerce").
108 See Robinson v. Bland, (1760) 1 Black.W. 234, 237, 96 Eng. Rep. 129, 131
(K.B.).
109 The examples are legion. See Thompson v. Musser, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 458, 464
(Pa. 1789) ("trade, commerce, and credit"); Wheeler v. Hughes, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 23, 23
(Pa. 1776) ("trade and commerce"); McMullen v. City Council, 1 S.C.L. 46, 46 (Super.
Ct. 1787) (including "trade and commerce" in a list separated by commas from other
activities "manufacturers, trade and commerce, and for the regulation of their police
and internal government"); Brown v. Harraden, (1791) 4 T.R. 148, 155, 100 Eng.
Rep. 943, 947 (K.B.); Saunderson v. Rolles, (1767) 4 Burr. 2064, 2069, 98 Eng. Rep.
77, 79 (K.B.); Waller, Hardr. at 301, 145 Eng. Rep. at 468; Martin v. Strachan, (1744)
Willes. 444, 452, 125 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263 (H.L.).
110 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1781).
111 See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
112 See Hobbs v. Young, (1691) 2 Salk. 610, 610, 91 Eng. Rep. 517, 517 (K.B.)
(referring to clothworker as being within statutory definition of trade); Simpson v.
Hartopp, (1744) Willes. 512, 513-16 125 Eng. Rep. 1295, 1296-97 (K.B.) (using word
"trade" for law of distraint). But see Raynard v. Chase, (1756) 1 Burr. 2, 6, 97 Eng.
Rep. 155, 157 (K.B.) (Mansfield, C.J.) (refusing to extend act prohibiting exercising
"trade" of a brewer without serving an apprenticeship to cover one in partnership
with properly qualified brewer).
113 See Robinson, 1 Black. W. at 238, 96 Eng. Rep. at 131 (reporting William
Blackstone as arguing that "the present is no mercantile question, but a transaction
between two Englishmen happening to be at Paris together, clear of any commercial
connexions"). This argument was apparently accepted by the court in Robinson v.
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explicitly were excluded from commerce. Tradesmen were
excluded from the class of "merchants" who carried on "trade and
commerce."'11 Judges and lawyers referred to times or places in
which there was gainful economic activity but no commerce, 116 or
commerce but not some other gainful economic activity.
117
Commerce benefited agriculture and manufacture by
circulating their products, but it did not include agriculture or
Bland, (1760) 1 Black.W. 256, 259-260, 96 Eng. Rep. 141, 142 (K.B.).
114 See Whitfield v. Lord Le Despencer, (1778) 2 Cowp. 754, 764, 98 Eng. Rep.
1344, 1349 (K.B.) (Mansfield, C.J.):
The post-master has no hire, enters into no contract, carries on no
merchandize or commerce. But the post-office is a branch of revenue, and a
branch of police, created by an Act of Parliament. As a branch of revenue,
there are great receipts; but there is likewise a great surplus of benefit and
advantage to the public, arising from the fund. As a branch of police, it puts
the whole correspondence of the kingdom (for the exceptions are very
trifling) under Government, and entrusts the management and direction of
it to the Crown, and officers appointed by the Crown. There is no analogy
therefore between the case of the post-master and a common carrier.
115 See, e.g., Farrington v. Lee, (1677) 1 Mod. 268, 269-70, 86 Eng. Rep. 873,
873-74 (C.P.):
Also this exception of accounts between merchants and their factors, must
be liberally expounded for their benefit; because the law-makers, in making
such an exception, had an eye to the encouragement of trade and
commerce. The words of the exception are, "other than such accounts as
concern the trade of merchandise, &c."
Atkyns, Justice. I think the makers of this statute had a greater regard to
the persons of merchants, than the causes of action between them: And the
reason was, because they are often out of the realm, and cannot always
prosecute their actions in due time. The statute makes no difference
betwixt an account current, and an account stated. I think, also, that no
other sort of tradesmen but merchants are within the benefit of this
exception; and that it does not extend to shop-keepers, they not being
within the same mischief.
116 See Hoare v. Allen, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 102, 105 (Pa. 1789) (referring to a
"growing spirit of commerce" in the time of Henry VIII); Attorney-General v. Graves,
(1752) Amb. 155, 156, 27 Eng. Rep. 103, 103-04 (Ch.) (referring to land use when
"trade and commerce were not [yet] introduced" but that "[a]fterwards, when trade
and commerce were extended, the locking up of lands became of greater
consequence"); Bright v. Eynon, (1757) 2 Keny. 53, 58, 96 Eng. Rep. 1104, 1106
(K.B.) (Mansfield, C.J.) (referring similarly to "a time when there was little
commerce"); Whitebread v. Brooksbanks, (1774) Lofft. 529, 535, 98 Eng. Rep. 783,
786 (K.B.) (referring to growing of corn at time before "the vast introduction of
commerce in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and since"); Cocksedge v. Fanshaw,
(1779) 1 Doul. 119, 130, 99 Eng. Rep. 80, 87 (K.B.) (concluding that "commerce in
corn" [wheat] must have arisen after the reign of Richard I [1189-99]).
117 See Clavell v. Littleton, (1710) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 150, 21 Eng. Rep. 950 (Ch.)
(stating that at a former time Londoners did not purchase real estate but rather
employed their wealth in commerce).
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manufacture. Jurists compared commerce to an enormous
circulatory system, carrying articles throughout the entire Body
Politic, as the blood in the human body carries oxygen and
nourishment.118 Thus, like the American Founders, English
lawyers and judges understood the tight interrelationship
between commerce and other parts of the economy, yet they were
careful to distinguish them conceptually. 119
Because commerce was so important and because it crossed
jurisdictional lines, it was the subject of a special body of law12 0 -
the Lex Mercatoria or Law Merchant. At one point, commercial
regulation was considered a branch of the royal prerogative, 12'
but judges soon imported the Lex Mercatoria into case law. The
Law Merchant was a particularly dynamic field just before the
Founding. English judges, led by the famous Lord Mansfield
(Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench from 1756 until
1788)122 adapted the common law to the quickening pace of
commercial exchange. William Blackstone, in his role as an
advocate in Robinson v. Bland,123 explained this development:
From mutual commerce and intercourse, which will quickly
follow, arises the necessity not only of a law of nations to
regulate that commerce and intercourse, but also of
communicating in some degree with the laws of other countries,
118 Compare Waller, Hardr. at 301, 145 Eng. Rep. at 468 (referring to "[t]he
advancement and encouragement of trade and merchandize, which are (as it were)
the blood which gives nourishment to the body politick of this kingdom; and
therefore it ought to receive a favourable and benign construction, for the better
support and maintenance of trade and commerce, the advancement whereof is of
great consideration in the eye of the law.") and Le Case del Union d'Escose ove
Angleterre (1606), Moo. K.B. 790, 794, 72 Eng. Rep. 908, 911 (K.B.) ("The blood that
passeth in the veins of the body natural by continual motion doth maintain and
refresh the spirits of life. So Traffick, Commerce, and Contracts in a Body Politick do
support, maintain and refresh the Common-wealth."), with HUDSON WEEKLY
GAZETTE, Jun. 24, 1788 in 21 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1224 ("The
channels of commerce, unclogged by duties or restrictions, would flow in streams of
mutual benefit....").
119 See infra notes 261-68 and accompanying text.
120 See, e.g., 2 MOLLOY, 316--17, 324-25; see also infra Part V.C.1.
121 See Brownlow v. Cox, (1615) 3 Bulst. 32, 32, 81 Eng. Rep. 27, 27 (K.B.) (Coke,
C.J.) (quoting Lord Bacon to the effect that "[tlhe Kings prerogative hath four
columns or pillars .... The fourth, which concerns matters of commerce.").
122 For a short biography, see James Oldham, Murray, William, First Earl of
Mansfield: 1705-1793, in BIOGRAPHY DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (click on
"Subscribers enter here" in the upper right hand corner; if necessary, enter user
name and password; type the name "Murray, William" in the query box).
123 (1760) 1 Black.W. 234, 96 Eng. Rep. 129 (K.B.).
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in respect to the contracts of individuals; in order to give a rule
for traders hinc inde [hence and thence] to resort to, for the
decision of their mercantile controversies. Therefore the [L]ex
[M]ercatoria was interwoven into our own common law. ... 124
Yet even engrafted onto common law, the Lex Mercatoria
remained something distinct. Unlike statutes and the traditional
common law, the Lex Mercatoria was based on merchant custom
and designed to be fairly standard everywhere. 125 The scope of
its substantive coverage was roughly similar to the scope
of "commerce": buying and selling, navigation, 126 marine
insurance, 127 factorage, 2 8 negotiable instruments, 129 and other
124 Id. at 237-38, 96 Eng. Rep. at 131.
125 See Luke v. Lyde, (1759) 2 Burr. 882, 97 Eng. Rep. 614 (IKB.), in which Lord
Mansfield quoted Cicero on the uniformity of natural law: "IT]he maritime law is not
the law of a particular country, but the general law of nations: 'non erit alia lex
Romce, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes et omni
tempore, una eademque lex obtinebit."' Id. at 887, 97 Eng. Rep. at 617.
The quotation is from Cicero's de re publica, Book 3, and can be rendered,
"[tlhere will not be one law at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another
later, but among all peoples and for all time, one and the same law will prevail." (My
translation). See M. TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, DE LEGIBUS 210-11 (James
Loeb ed., Harvard University Press 1966) (1928) (text and another translation);
Burrows v. Jemineau, (1726) Sel. Ca. t. King 69, 70, 25 Eng. Rep. 228, 228 (Ch.)
("Mhe law-merchant was an universal law, that it extends to all trading people, and
not to be circumscribed by local or municipal laws; and if it were not so, it would be
destructive to trade and commerce.").
In commercial affairs under the law merchant, which is the law of nations,
there are instances where sentences for or against contracts abroad have
been given, and received here on trials, as evidence, and have had their
weight. And this has been allowed on a principle of the law of nations,
which all countries by consent agree to, for the sake of carrying on
commerce which concerns the public in general.
Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, (1752) 2 Hag. Con. 395, 420, 161 Eng. Rep. 782, 791
(Consis. Ct. London).
126 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
127 Pray v. Edie, (1786) 1 T.R. 313, 313, 99 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1113-14 (K.B.)
(referring to international ship and cargo insurance as commerce); cf. Earl of
Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750) 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 143, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 93 (Ch.)
(stating that bottomry contracts are "necessary for trade and commerce").
128 See supra note 100.
129 BILLS OF EXCHANGE: See, e.g., Stores v. Stores, 1 Root 139, 139 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1789) (per curiam) (order drawn on a third person is an "article of commerce');
Master v. Miller, (1793) 1 Anst. 225, 229-30, 145 Eng. Rep. 855, 856 (K.B.)
(stressing that the legal effect of negotiable instruments which pass hands must be
preserved); King v. Thom, (1786) 1 T.R. 487, 488-89, 99 Eng. Rep. 1212, 1213 (K.B.)
(stating that following the usage and custom of merchants, the law has made certain
securities negotiable for the "convenience of commerce"); Dawkes v. De Lorane,
(1771) 3 Wils. K.B. 207, 212, 95 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1018 (K.B.) (stating, per Lord Chief
Justice de Grey, that 'The Court ought to be very careful how they [sic] lay down the
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aspects of commercial finance. 130
Occasionally, the term "commerce" was used in a context
implying a meaning wider than mercantile exchange. The word
appeared in some cases dealing with perpetuities, where it
seemed to include the buying and selling of land. 131 This usage
was rare, however; and usually when a court refers to
"commerce" in real estate case, the court was saying that
restrictions on the alienation of land make it more difficult to
law, in cases of bills of exchange, which so highly concern trade and commerce");
Pillans v. Van Mierop, (1765) 3 Burr. 1663, 1672, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1040 (IKB.)
(Mansfield, C.J.) ("The true reason why the acceptance of a bill of exchange shall
bind, is not on account of the acceptor's having or being supposed to have effects in
hand; but for the convenience of trade and commerce. Fides est servanda.");
Rawlinson v. Stone, (1746) 3 Wils. K.B. 1, 2-3, 95 Eng. Rep. 899, 900 (K.B.)
(discussing effect of indorsing of bills of exchange on merchants and effect on "trade
and commerce"); Bomley v. Frazier, (1721) 1 Str. 441, 441, 93 Eng. Rep. 622, 623
(KB.) ('The design of the law of merchants in distinguishing these [bills of
exchange] from all other contracts, by making them assignable, was for the
convenience of commerce, that they might pass from hand to hand in the way of
trade, in the same manner as if they were specie."); Hussey v. Jacob, (1703) 3 Raym.
Ld. 93, 93, 92 Eng. Rep. 582, 583 (K.B.) (recognizing a special custom among
merchants regarding bills of exchange); Allen v. Dockwra, (1698) 1 Salk. 127, 127, 91
Eng. Rep. 119, 119 (K.B.) (governing bills of exchange by a rule to ensure against a
development "prejudicial to commerce"); Belchier v. Parsons, (1754) 1 Keny. 38, 47,
96 Eng. Rep. 908, 911 (Ch.) ("[Blut since the increase of trade, and commerce, inland
bills of exchange [are] becoming more frequent, that has not been insisted on.");
Burrows v. Jemineau, (1726) Sel. Ca. t. King 69, 70, 25 Eng. Rep. 228, 228 (Ch.)
(arguing that court should follow rule on foreign bills of exchange that was not
"destructive to trade and commerce").
BANK NOTES: See Miller v. Race, (1758) 2 Keny. 189, 194, 96 Eng. Rep. 1151,
1152 (K.B.) (Mansfield, C.J.) (the law allows bank notes to pass as cash for the
benefit of commerce); Miller v. Race, (1758) 1 Burr. 452, 457, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401
(K.B.) (different report of same case).
PROMISSORY NOTES: See Wheeler v. Hughes, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 23, 23 (1776)
(argument that promissory notes are negotiable "to encourage trade and commerce");
Mournier v. Meyrey, 1 S.C.L. 24, 24 (C.P. & Gen. Sess. 1785) (notes held negotiable
to prevent injury to "trade and commerce"); Brown v. Harraden, (1791) 4 T.R. 148,
152, 100 Eng. Rep. 943, 945 (K.B.) (ruling that Parliament decided that for the
benefit of "trade and commerce," promissory notes ought to have the same grace
period as bills of exchange).
130 See, e.g., Eyre v. Eyre, (1750) 2 Ves. Sen. 86, 86, 28 Eng. Rep. 56, 57 (Ch.)
(discussing loans and trades in the course of business).
131 See, e.g., Legan & Vanse v. Latany, 1 Va. Col. Dec. R39, R40 (Gen. Ct. 1730)
(stating that "the necessity of Commerce between Man & Man" have led the courts
to create executory uses and devises); Attorney-General v. Lady Downing, (1767)
Wilm. 1, 27, 97 Eng. Rep. 1, 11 (Ch.) (holding that in a "commercial country" the
king ensures that too much land is not "throw[n] ... out of commerce"); Duke of
Marlborough v. Earl Godolphin, (1759) 1 Eden. 404, 414, 28 Eng. Rep. 741, 745 (Ch.)
(stating that restrictions on alienation may keep property "e commercio" [out of
commerce]).
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raise the funds necessary for commerce in the mercantile
sense.
132
Moreover, as a synonym for traffic or intercourse,
"commerce" occasionally denoted sexual relations, especially of
the casual sort. 133 This is also a possible meaning of the Latin
forebear, commercium,134 although the sexual use of "commerce"
in the cases was far less common than the mercantile usage.
Even less common-indeed, almost non-existent in the cases-
was the still wider sense of "commerce" as "social intercourse."1 35
What of the Crosskey definition as "all economic activity"?
Examples are hard to come by. One case seems to refer to any
productive asset as "commerce," and a few others are ambiguous,
in that they arguably (although not clearly) could be read as
communicating a broader economic meaning. 136 In a handful of
132 Martin v. Strachan, (1744) Willes. 444, 452, 125 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263 (H.L.)
("To the public, as it was prejudicial to trade and commerce to have estates always
continue in the same families, without even a power of raising money upon them.");
Duke of Norfolk v. Howard, (1683) 1 Vern. 163, 164, 23 Eng. Rep. 388, 389 (Ch.) ("A
perpetuity is a thing odious in law, and destructive to the commonwealth: it would
put a stop to commerce, and prevent the circulation of the riches of the kingdom.");
Murrey v. Eyton, (1680) Raym. T. 338, 356, 83 Eng. Rep. 176, 185 (C.P.) ("If it were
to restrain such alienations as are favoured in law.., whereby trade and commerce
might be prevented, debts unpaid, and children unprovided for, which is the reason
that the law disallows of perpetuities and conditions which restrain alienation.").
133 See, e.g., Priest v. Parrot, (1750-51) 2 Ves. Sen. 160, 161, 28 Eng. Rep. 103,
104 (Ch.) (referring to non-marital intercourse as "commerce"); Robinson v. Cox,
(1741) 9 Mod. 263, 265, 88 Eng. Rep. 439, 441 (Ch.) (stating of a married man and a
prostitute, "the same criminal commerce was continued between Mrs. Cox and Mr.
Robinson even after the marriage"); Hill v. Spencer, (1725) Amb. 836, 837, 27 Eng.
Rep. 524, 524 (Ch.) (referring to adultery as "illegal commerce"); Lindo v. Belisario,
(1795) 1 Hag. Con. 216, 231, 161 Eng. Rep. 530, 535 (Consis. Ct. London) (referring
to "commerce between the sexes").
134 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
135 See Kelsy v. Wright, 1 Root 83, 83 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1783). It does refer to
one being charged with "having illicit intercourse and commerce with the enemies of
this [Connecticut] and the United States," id., but it is unclear whether economic or
social commerce is meant.
136 See Giles v. Mallicote, 2 Va. Col. Dec. B71, B75 (Gen. Ct. 1738) (referring to
income property, such as land or a slave, as "[c]ommerce").
For examples of ambiguous uses, see, for example, Goddard v. Smith, (1704) 6
Mod. 261, 261, 87 Eng. Rep. 1007, 1007, 2 Salk. 767, 778, 91 Eng. Rep. 632, 633
(K.B.) (using the term "commerce" where it could mean either trade, other economic
dealings, or other human interaction). See also Bosworth v. Hearne, (1737) Andr. 91,
95, 95 Eng. Rep. 312, 314 (K.B.), stating:
Now the grievance attempted to be guarded against by this by-law is, the
annoyance occasioned by carts and drays being in the streets, whereby the
general commerce of the city was much retarded: and this certainly ought
to be taken care of, though it be to the detriment of a particular business.
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instances, the closely-related term "merchant" was connected
with non-mercantile occupations-specifically tailors and
physicians 137-whose activities in the market place might
therefore be characterized as "commerce." This expansive
definition of merchant was quite old, however, and seems to have
been repudiated by the time of the Founding.138
B. Legal Dictionaries
When faced with a problematic word in a legal document
today, the lawyer's first instinct often is to consult a legal
dictionary. It is therefore remarkable that in the debate over
"commerce," none of the chief participants, to my knowledge, has
consulted eighteenth century legal dictionaries-lay dictionaries,
to be sure, but none of the legal dictionaries used in America at
the time. 139
One of the most popular books in this class-if not the most
popular-was the New Law-Dictionary of the productive Giles
Jacob,1 40 which had gone through eight editions by 1762. The
Id. While "general commerce" could refer to all business, obstructions in the street
are more likely to impede exchange-commerce in the narrower sense.
Some cases include wording that at first glance might support the Crosskey
definition, but on further investigation turn out not to do so. See, e.g., Pray v. Edie,
(1786) 1 T.R. 313, 313, 99 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1113 (K.B.). In Pray, id., 99 Eng. Rep. at
1114, the phrase "general commerce" is used in a way that might support the
Crosskey definition, except that the larger context is one of changes in the law
applying to insurance of ships and cargoes in foreign trade and the effects of those
changes on foreign merchants.
137 See Mayor and Commonalty of London v. Wilks, (1704) 2 Salk. 445, 445, 91
Eng. Rep. 386, 386 (K.B.) (referring to "merchant-tailor" as a common term); The
King v. Middleton, (1663) 1 Keb. 625, 625, 83 Eng. Rep. 1149, 1149 (K.B.) (referring
to a corporation of physicians as a corporation "for commerce"); Pelham's Case,
(1588) 1 Co. Rep. 3a, 13b, 76 Eng. Rep. 8, 30 (Exch.) ("[R]eleased and quit-claimed to
the said Henry Page, by the name of Henry Page, of London, merchant-taylor,"
apparently in recognition the guild name).
138 See Regina v. Harper, (1705) 2 Salk. 611, 611, 91 Eng. Rep. 518, 518 (K.B.)
("[The Court seemed to think a merchant-taylor was nonsense and unintelligible;
they did not know what a merchant-taylor meant."); 2 COKE, supra note 2, at 668
(apparently distinguishing tailors from merchants); JACOB, DICTIONARY, supra note
2 (defining "merchant") ("[T]he Word Merchant formerly extended to all Sorts of
Traders, Buyers and Sellers. But every one that buys and sells is not at this Day
under the Denomination of a Merchant; only those who traffick in the Way of
Commerce...."); 15 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY
361 (1743) (citing Regina).
139 See, e.g., OTIS, supra note 2, at 36 (an example of a contemporary American
lawyer citing the Jacob, Cowell, and Cunningham dictionaries).
140 For Jacob's biography, see Matthew Kilburn, Jacob, Giles (bap. 1686, d.
1744), Legal and Literary Author, in BIOGRAPHY DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (click on
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edition of that year (as did other editions) 141 defined "commerce"
as "Commerce, (Commercium) Traffick, Trade or Merchandise in
Buying and Selling of Goods. See Merchant."'142
Note the definition's connection to commercium, as we
observed in the cases. Note also that Jacob referred the reader to
his entry for "merchant." He defined a merchant as follows:
'Merchant, (Mercator) Is one that buys and trades in any Thing:
And as Merchandise includes all Goods and Wares exposed to
Sale in Fairs or Markets."1 43 He proceeded to demonstrate that
one who bought and sold was not necessarily a merchant:
[T]he Word Merchant formerly extended to all Sorts of Traders,
Buyers and Sellers. But every one that buys and sells is not at
this Day under the Denomination of a Merchant; only those who
traffick in the Way of Commerce, by Importation or Exportation,
or carry on Business by Way of Emption, Vendition, Barter,
Permutation or Exchange, and which make it their Living to
buy and sell, by a continued Assiduity, or frequent Negotiation,
in the Mystery [i.e., skill]144 of Merchandising, are esteemed
Merchants. Those that buy Goods, to reduce them by their own
Art or Industry, into other Forms than they are of, and then to
sell them, are Artificers and not Merchants: Bankers, and such
as deal by Exchange, are properly called Merchants.145
So merchants were different from artificers in that
merchants did not make or improve goods. Farmers, miners, and
manufacturers sold their goods to others, but that did not render
them merchants. 146 Moreover, while other constructions are
"Subscribers enter here" in the upper right hand corner; if necessary, enter user
name and password; type the name "Giles, Jacob" in the query box). For the wide
use of his work, see JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 59, 61, 63.
141 JACOB, DICTIONARY, supra note 2. The edition thus cited is that of 1762. I
have checked the editions of 1729 and 1750 and found substantially the same
definitions. The definition owes much to other sources. See infra Part V.C.2.
142 JACOB, DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
143 Id.
144 See 2 COKE, supra note 2, at 668 (defining "mysterie" in this context as "ars,
seu artificium" [skill or profession]-an occupation requiring skill).
145 JACOB, DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (emphasis added to the words "only those
who traffick in the Way of Commerce").
146 To be sure, the term "merchant-taylor" was found, implying that a tailor was
a kind of merchant. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2 ("A merchant-taylor is a
common term; per Holt Ch. J. 2 Salk. 445. Mayor, &. Of London v. Wilks.").
Apparently it was a guild name. In any event, the English courts disapproved the
term, supra note 137, and Coke distinguishes between merchants and other
occupations, including that of "taylor." See 2 COKE, supra note 2, at 668.
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possible,1 47 the most natural inference is that only merchants,
and not artificers, "traffick[ed] in the way of Commerce"-that
the artificer's sale of his product was not "commerce" as to him,
although of course it was to the merchant. If this is so, then the
definition of the term "commerce" inferrable from the leading
legal dictionary was an exceedingly narrow one.
Jacob then added that regulation of merchants was through
a special branch of the law:
Merchants were always particularly regarded by the Common
Law; though the municipal Laws of England, or indeed of any
one Realm, are not sufficient for the ordering and determining
the Affairs of Traffick, and Matters relating to Commerce;
Merchandise being so universal and extensive that it is
impossible; therefore the Law Merchant (so called from its
universal Concern) all Nations take special Knowledge of; and
the Common and Statute Laws of this Kingdom leave the
Causes of Merchants in many Cases to their own peculiar Law.
Ibid. In the Reign of King Ed. 4. a Merchant Stranger made
Suit before the King's Privy Council, for several Bales of Silk
feloniously taken from him, wherein it was moved, that this
Matter should be determined at Common Law; but it was
answered by the Lord Chancellor, that as this Suit was brought
by a Merchant, he was not bound to sue according to the Law of
the Land.148
The rest of the entry set some of the special rules applicable to
merchants and identified some of the leading mercantile
companies.
Jacob's definitions were not unusual. As we shall see, they
recurred in contemporaneous treatises on commercial law. 149
Furthermore, two other contemporary dictionaries-that by
Timothy Cunningham and the anonymous "Student's
Dictionary"-contained definitions that closely tracked the
language used by Jacob, including the distinction between
artificers and merchants and the qualification that merchants,
unlike others, trafficked in commerce.1 50
147 Based on this definition, one conceivably could argue that artificers
trafficked in commerce also, but not as merchants did.
148 JACOB, DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
149 See infra Part V.C.2.
150 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2:
Merchant, Every one that buys and sells, is not from thence to be
denominated a merchant, but only he who trafficks in the way of commerce
by importation or exportation; or otherwise in the way of emption,
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C. Treatises
1. Blackstone's Commentaries
After its publication in 1765, Blackstone's Commentaries
became the most popular legal treatise in America. Although its
influence on the Founders can be overstated, it also is true that it
was specifically cited twice at the federal convention. 151  Its
nature as a summary of existing law offers important clues as to
dominant legal usage.
Blackstone frequently employed the word "commerce." On
two occasions, he used the term in a non-economic manner to
mean general social intercourse among human beings. 15 2 The
vendition, barter, permutation or exchange, and who makes it his living to
buy and sell, and that by a continued assiduity, or frequent negotiation in
the mystery of merchandizing; but those that buy goods to reduce them by
their own art or industry into other forms than formerly they were of, are
properly called artificers, not merchants; not but [sic] merchants may, and
do alter commodities after they have bought them, for the more expedite
fate of them, but that renders them not artificers, but the same is part of
the mystery of merchants; but persons buying commodities, though they
alter not the form, yet if they are such as sell the same at future days of
payment for a greater price than they cost them, they are not properly
called merchants, but are usurers, though they obtain several other names,
as warehouse keepers, and the like; but bankers, and such as deal by
exchange are properly called merchants. 3 Molloy 456, 457 cap. 7 felt. 13.
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2; see also STUDENT'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 74.
Merchant, was formerly taken for one that bought and sold any Thing: But
now this Appellation is properly restricted only to such as traffick in
Commerce by Way of Importation or Exportation, or trade in the Way of
Buying, Selling, Barter, or Exchange, and who continually make it their
Livelihood to buy and sell: To these we may add Bankers, as well as those
that deal by Exchange, who are likewise termed Merchants. Such as buy
Wares, &c. to change them by their own Art or Industry into other Forms,
are not Merchants, but properly Artificers. As the Laws of England, or
those of any other Nation are not sufficient for determining the Affairs of
Commerce and Merchandize, Traffick being so universal, that it is next to
an Impossibility to do it; therefore all Nations, as well as we, take
particular Notice of, and shew Regard to the Law Merchant, which is a Law
among themselves; and the Causes of Merchants are in most Cases left to
their own Law, which you may see in Lex Mercat.
Id.
151 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton); 2 FARRAND,
supra note 2, at 448 (John Dickinson).
152 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES at *121 ("But every man, when
he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so
valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual
commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community has
thought proper to establish."); 2 id. at *174 ("[B]y perpetuities... estates are made
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context of three economic uses is sufficiently undefined so that a
reader could take the word in either a broad or narrow sense. 153
But by far Blackstone's most common use of "commerce" was to
mean mercantile exchange and its incidents. He tied the term
tightly to trade,154 traffic,1 55 navigation,1 56 buying and selling, 157
markets,158 exchange with foreign nations, 159 and associated
incapable of answering those ends, of social commerce, and providing for the sudden
contingencies of private life, for which property was at first established.").
153 See 1 id. at *455 ("These artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies
corporate, (corpora corporata) or corporations: of which there is a great variety
subsisting, for the advancement of religion, of learning, and of commerce.")
(emphasis in original); 1 id. at *459 ("some for the advancement and regulation of
manufactures and commerce"). One could argue that "manufacture and commerce"
is an example of the use of synonyms in "elegant variation," although I think it is
more likely that Blackstone is referring to two separate branches of economic
endeavor. The third unclear use appears at 4 id. at *421, and is discussed infra text
accompanying note 171.
154 See 1 id. at *161 ("Likewise, for the benefit of commerce, it is provided by
statute ... that any trader ... served with legal process for any just debt .. "); 2 id.
at *160 ("originally permitted only among traders, for the benefit of commerce"); 1
id. at *264 ("affairs of traffic and merchandize"); 2 id. at *290 ("And now, the whole
of them is not only subject to be pawned for the debts of the owner, but likewise to be
absolutely sold for the benefit of trade and commerce .... "); 2 id. at *456 ("And that
the allowance of moderate interest tends greatly to the benefit of the public,
especially in a trading country, will appear from that generally acknowleged
principle, that commerce cannot subsist without mutual and extensive credit."); 2 id.
at *385 ("since the introduction and extension of trade and commerce"); 2 id. at *398
("By the rules of the antient common law, there could be no future property, to take
place in expectancy, created in personal goods and chattels; because ... the
exigencies of trade requiring ... a frequent circulation thereof, it would ... put a
stop to the freedom of commerce, if such limitations in remainder were generally
tolerated and allowed.").
155 See 1 id. at *253 ("[Ajnd equally different from the bigotry of the canonists,
who looked on trade as inconsistent with christianity [sic], and determined ... that
it was impossible with a safe conscience to exercise any traffic .... "); 2 id. at *449
("Thus, in the dark ages of monkish superstition and civil tyranny, when interest
was laid under a total interdict, commerce was also at it's [sic] lowest ebb, and fell
entirely into the hands of the Jews and Lombards: but when men's minds began to
be more enlarged, when true religion and real liberty revived, commerce grew again
into credit ... .").
156 See 1 id. at *283 ("[T]he improvement of commerce, navigation, and
correspondence .. ").
157 See 2 id. at *449 ("But property may also in some cases be transferred by
sale, though the vendor hath none at all in the goods: for it is expedient that the
buyer, by taking proper precautions, may at all events be secure of his purchase;
otherwise all commerce between man and man must soon be at an end.").
158 See 1 id. at *264 (listing among the king's powers to regulate commerce "the
establishment of public marts, or places of buying and selling, such as markets and
fairs"); 2 id. at *160 ("For both the statute merchant and statute staple are
securities for money; the one entered into pursuant to the statute 13 Edw. I. de
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financial activities. 160  For Blackstone, in other words,
"commerce" was the sort of thing merchants do161-the conduct
governed by the Lex Mercatoria.162  As far as I can find,
Blackstone never unambiguously employed "commerce" to mean
"general economic activity." On the contrary, as was true of
several English cases,163 he sometimes used the word in a way
that necessarily excluded some gainful economic activities. For
example, he noted that the ancient Roman aristocracy treated
commercial employment as dishonorable.' 64 As he and every
other educated Englishman knew, Roman senators were
expected to focus on agriculture instead. 65 Similarly, Blackstone
mercatoribus, and thence called a statute merchant ; the other pursuant to the
statute 27 Edw. III. c. 9. before the mayor of the staple, that is to say, the grand
mart for the principal commodities or manufactures of the kingdom, formerly held
by act of parliament in certain trading towns, and thence this security is called a
statute staple. They are both, I say, securities for debts, originally permitted only
among traders, for the benefit of commerce.").
159 See 1 id. at *361 (encouraging foreign commerce).
160 See 1 id. at *266 (discussing royal power over money, "the medium of
commerce"); 2 id. at *119 (discussing the fact that alienation of estates tail permit
them to be security for debts incurred in commerce); 2 id. at *160 ("For both the
statute merchant and statute staple are securities for money .... They are both, I
say, securities for debts, originally permitted only among traders, for the benefit of
commerce .... "); 2 id. at *161 (referring to hypothecation of land to serve needs of
commerce); 2 id. at *313 (same); 2 id. at *456 ("And that the allowance of moderate
interest tends greatly to the benefit of the public, especially in a trading country,
will appear from that generally acknowleged principle, that commerce cannot
subsist without mutual and extensive credit.").
161 See 2 id. at *160 (referring to a statute de mercatoribus [on merchants] "for
the benefit of commerce"); 1 id. at *264.
Another light in which the laws of England consider the king with regard to
domestic concerns, is as the arbiter of commerce. By commerce, I at present
mean domestic commerce only. It would lead me into too large a field, if I
were to attempt to enter upon the nature of foreign trade, it's [sic]
privileges, regulations, and restrictions .... Whereas no municipal laws
can be sufficient to order and determine the very extensive and complicated
affairs of traffic and merchandise.
Id.
162 See 1 id. at *265 ("For which reason the affairs of commerce are regulated by
a law of their own, called the law merchant or lex mercatoria, which all nations
agree in and take notice of.").
163 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
164 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *253 ("Very different from the
genius of the Roman people; who in their manners, their constitution, and even in
their laws, treated commerce as a dishonorable employment, and prohibited the
exercise thereof to persons of birth, or rank, or fortune.").
165 The lex Claudia of 218 B.C. impeded senatorial participation in trade. See
OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 247 (2d ed. 1970) (stating that one Quintus
Claudius was the author of a law which forbade senators from owning sea-going
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referred to transitions between earlier times when gainful
economic activity did not include commerce and later times when
it did. 166
The following extract may assist in understanding
Blackstone's view of commerce. The discussion pertains to the
king's power over commercial relations. Observe how the
passage prefigures two of the related powers the Constitution
granted to Congress: to regulate weights and measures and to
coin and regulate money. I have italicized words closely
affiliated with the dominant usage of "commerce."
ANOTHER light in which the laws of England consider the
king with regard to domestic concerns, is as the arbiter of
commerce. By commerce, I at present mean domestic commerce
only. It would lead me into too large a field, if I were to attempt
to enter upon the nature of foreign trade, it's [sic] privileges,
regulations, and restrictions; and would be also quite beside the
purpose of these commentaries, which are confined to the laws
of England: whereas no municipal laws can be sufficient to
order and determine the very extensive and complicated affairs
of traffic and merchandize; [sic] neither can they have a proper
authority for this purpose .... For which reason the affairs of
commerce are regulated by a law of their own, called the law
merchant or [Liex [Miercatoria, which all nations agree in and
take notice of. And in particular the law of England does in
many cases refer itself to it, and leaves the causes of merchants
to be tried by their own peculiar customs; and that often even in
matters relating to inland trade, as for instance with regard to
the drawing, the acceptance, and the transfer, of bills of
exchange.
WITH us in England, the king's prerogative, so far as it relates
to mere domestic commerce, will fall principally under the
following articles:
FIRST, the establishment of public marts, or places of buying
and selling, such as markets and fairs...
SECONDLY, the regulation of weights and measures...
THIRDLY, as money is the medium of commerce, it is the
vessels over a certain size and noting that smaller vessels "would suffice to transport
their agricultural produce").
166 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *385 ("But of later years, since
the introduction and extension of trade and commerce .... "); see also 2 id. at *313
("Besides the new occasions and necessities, introduced by the advancement of
commerce, required means to be devised of charging and encumbering estates, and
of making them liable to a multitude of conditions and minute designations for the
purposes of raising money, without an absolute sale of the land.").
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king's prerogative, as the arbiter of domestic commerce, to give
it authority or make it current. Money is an universal medium,
or common standard, by comparison with which the value of all
merchandize may be ascertained: or it is a sign, which
represents the respective values of all commodities. 167
Professors Nelson and Pushaw cite a passage from
Blackstone that they present as evidence of a broader use. 168 The
same passage was referenced by Crosskey, 16 9 and may have been
gleaned from his work. 170 It reads as follows:
Much also was done, under the auspices of [Edward III], for
establishing our domestic manufactures; by prohibiting the
exportation of English wool, and the importation or wear of
foreign cloth or furs; and by encouraging clothworkers from
other countries to settle here. Nor was the legislature
inattentive to many other branches of commerce, or indeed to
commerce in general: for, in particular, it enlarged the credit of
the merchant, by introducing the statute staple; whereby he
might the more readily pledge his lands for the security of his
mercantile debts.
And, as personal property now grew, by the extension of trade,
to be much more considerable than formerly, care was taken, in
case of intestacies, to appoint administrators particularly
nominated by the law; to distribute that personal property
among the creditors and kindred of the deceased, which before
had been usually applied, by the officers of the ordinary, to uses
then denominated pious. 171
However, this selection is at best ambiguous. The "branches
of commerce" Blackstone refers to likely include only the concepts
with which he immediately surrounded that phrase: export,
immigration, and mercantile credit. Structurally, the phrase is
167 1 id. at *263-65 (italics added).
168 Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 16.
169 See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 2, at 101; 2 id. at 1283 n.48.
170 The Blackstone citation is adjacent to a reference to the same pamphlet in
Nelson/Pushaw, as in Crosskey. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 2, at 101; 2 id. at 1283
n.47. There is also an error common to them: each attributes the pamphlet to George
Grenville, when in fact, it was written by Thomas Whately, Grenville's assistant. On
Whately and his authorship of the pamphlet, see Rory T. Cornish, Whately, Thomas
(1726-1772), Politician and Author, in BIOGRAPHY DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (click
on "Subscribers enter here" in the upper right hand corner; if necessary, enter user
name and password; type the name 'Vhately, Thomas" in the query box).
171 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *421.
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as likely to include "intestacies" as "domestic manufactures," but
intestacy was not commerce even under the broader definition. 172
If, however, Blackstone did mean to label "domestic
manufactures" a "branch of commerce," he did not necessarily
mean it was commerce per se. Legal writers sometimes employed
the term "branch" in the way we would use "root"-that is, as a
source of commerce. 173 Thus, in The Regulations Lately Made
Concerning the Colonies, and the Taxes Imposed Upon Them,
Considered, by Thomas Whately, 174 (sometimes erroneously
attributed to George Grenville 175), the author refers to sugar cane
production and the consumption of luxuries as "branches" of
commerce and revenue."176 Of course, sugar cane production and
luxury goods are not "revenue" any more than they are
"commerce," but they certainly can be sources of both. This use
of "branch" to refer to both roots and offshoots-sources and
172 Thus, there were repeated federalist assurances that the law of decedent
estates would be outside the national sphere-and a fortiori outside commerce. See 5
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant) (citing
wills and administrators); 3 ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 40 (quoting Edmund Pendleton
as stating at the Virginia ratifying convention that under the new Constitution
Congress could not change Virginia's rules of descent); 3 id. at 620 (reporting James
Madison, at the same convention, clearly implying that the national government
would not have power over the law of descent); THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 141
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Gideon ed. 1818)
(mocking the idea that the federal government will have control over the "rules of
descent"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 160 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey
& James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001) (1788) (same).
173 This was not always, or even usually, true, however. See, e.g., Grant v.
Vaughan, (1764) 3 Burr. 1516, 1527, 97 Eng. Rep. 957, 963 (K.B.) (referring to
negotiable instruments as a branch of commerce); Planche v. Fletcher, (1779) 1
Dougl. 251, 252, 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 164 (K.B.) (referring to shipping as a branch of
commerce); Francis v. Wyatt, (1764) 1 B1.W. 483, 485, 96 Eng. Rep. 279, 280 (K.B.)
(characterizing a public livery stable as a "branch of commerce"). Moreover, this
usage is neither in Samuel Johnson's Dictionary nor in the Oxford English
Dictionary. Neither, however, is the "broad" definition of commerce propounded by
Professor Crosskey. See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1755); 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989) (defining
"commerce").
174 WHATELY, supra note 2.
175 See infra note 178.
176 See WHATELY, supra note 2, at 71 (luxury linens); id. at 78 (sugar cane); see
also id. at 45 (referring to beaver skins as an "Article of American Produce" and
[apparently] a "Branch of British Manufacture") (italics in original); id. at 50
(referring a whale fishery as a "Branch of Trade"); id. at 55 (referring to naval stores
as a "Branch of Trade"). Whately also used "branch" in a more modern sense to mean
a "division." See id. at 78 (referring to a branch of manufacturing); Cf. id. at 88
(using "Branch of the Revenue" in a way that "branch" could mean either "source" or
"division").
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outcomes-is another example of a Latinism in the eighteenth
century, for it parallels the double meaning of the common legal
word stirpes.'77  Notably, when Whately used the term
"commerce" alone-without "branch"-he employed it in the
common sense of mercantile trade. 178
In sum, almost all of Blackstone's references to economic
"commerce" clearly partake of the narrow definition, and the few
that do not are ambiguous at best.
2. Other Treatises
I examined the use of the term "commerce" and "merchant"
in several other leading contemporary treatises. All yielded
similar results. 179
Insofar as I could find, Edward Coke did not define
commerce in his Institutes, but all his references to merchants
were closely connected with traffic and exchange.180 In one
passage he apparently distinguished merchants from
agricultural and manufacturing workers."'8 As English cases
had likened the circulation of commerce to the circulation of
blood, Coke wrote that "trade and traffique is the livelihood of a
merchant, and the life of the commonwealth."'18 2
177 See LEWIS, supra note 2, at 1760.
178 See, e.g., WHATELY, supra note 2, at 21 (referring to barter as the only
"Commerce" among certain primitive Indians, although presumably not their only
gainful economic activity); id. at 64 (stating that America can produce "[plrovisions
for Subsistence, Commodities for Commerce, and the raw Materials for
Manufacturers to work with"); id. at 89 (providing a parallel usage of "trade" and
"commerce'); id. at 91 (referring to illicit Intercourse as a kind of "Commerce"); id. at
96 (referring to illegal imports as "illicit Commerce"). Both Crosskey and
NelsonlPushaw cite Whately's pamphlet, which they erroneously attribute to George
Grenville, as support for the view that commerce could mean all productive
activities. As suggested by the text, I think they misunderstand Whately's meaning.
179 Except, of course, with respect to the word "trader" when referring to the
specific definition of that term in the bankruptcy statutes. See infra notes 207-08
and accompanying text.
180 See 2 COKE, supra note 2, at 28 (referring to "trade and traffique" as the
livelihood of a merchant); see also id. at 57 (connecting merchants with importing
and exporting); id. at 322-23 (connecting them with "trade and traffique"); id. at 741
(connecting "merchant strangers" [aliens] with importing); id. at 743 (connecting
merchants with "trade and traffick").
i1 See id. at 668 (distinguishing between "all lawfull [sic] arts, trades, and
occupations, as taylor [sic], merchant, mercer, husbandman, labourer, and the
like..."); see also id. at 507 (reporting on banishment of all Jews "saving
merchants, and such as should get their living by the work of their hands").
182 Id. at 28.
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Giles Jacob's Lex Mercatoria or, the Merchant's Companion8 3
defined commerce as the "Trade of Buying and Selling of
Goods. ' 184 The anonymous General Treatise of Naval Trade and
Commerce18 5 stated as follows:
TRADE or Commerce is a Business or mutual Employment,
arising from the Necessity Men are under of receiving from one
another such Things as they are obliged to exchange for the
Relief of their respective Necessities, and the Support of human
Life, and is exercised in the Buying, Selling, Bartering and
Exchanging of Wares and Commodities; and in a Naval
Signification it extends to all Traffick or Merchandizing with
other Countries.186
This work contained the same limitation on the definition of
one who engages in commerce-a merchant-that appears in the
legal dictionaries of the time.18 7
Wyndham Beawes' Lex Mercatoria Rediviva clearly
distinguished the work of artificers-those who provided
commodities-from commerce, which was the circulation and
exchange of commodities:
COMMERCE is almost as old as the Creation, and a very small
Increase of Mankind proved its Utility, and demonstrated the
natural Dependance [sic] our Species had upon one another:
Their Employs were (by the Wise Disposition of Providence)
suited to their Wants; and the diligent Discharge of the one (by
his Blessing) rendered sufficient to supply the moderate
Cravings of the other; and tho' Tilling of the Earth, or Feeding
of Flocks, were the sole primevous [sic] Labours, yet (limited as
they were) they could not be exercised by our first Parents, with
183 GILES JACOB, LEX MERCATORIA OR, THE MERCHANT'S COMPANION (2d ed.
1729).
184 Id. at 389.
185 Supra note 2.
186 1 GENERAL NAVAL, supra note 2, at 1.
187 See id. at 5-6.
A Merchant, here in England, is one that buys and trades in any Thing:
And as Merchandize includes all Goods and Wares exposed to Sale in Fairs
or Markets, so the Word Merchant anciently extended to all Sorts of
Traders, Buyers and Sellers. But every Man who buys and sells Goods is
not at this Day under the Denomination of a Merchant; only those that
Traffick in the way of Commerce, by Importation or Exportation, or carry
on Business by way of Emption, Vendition, Barter, Permutation or
Exchange, and which make it their Business to buy and sell, are esteemed
Merchants.
Id. at 5-6.
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that Comfort their great Creator designed them, without a
mutual Correspondence and Traffick, as the Husband-man's
Subsistance would have been poor without the Grasier's Help,
and the latter's comfortless, under the Want of Corn, Fruits,
and Pulse to his Milk; this led them to an Exchange of
Commodities; and thus Commerce commenced in the Infant
World.188
Moreover, as did other authors, Beawes distinguished
between merchants and artificers. 189
188 BEAWES, supra note 2, at 1.
189
THE Term Merchant (in Latin Mercator) or Trader, from Tradendo, as
Minshew derives it, is in England, according to the general Acceptation of
the Word, now confined to him who buys and sells any Commodities in
Gross, or deals in Exchange; that trafficks in the Way of Commerce, either
by Importation or Exportation; or that carries on Business by Way of
Emption, Vendition, Barter, Permutation, or Exchange; and that makes a
continued Assiduity or frequent Negociation in the Mystery of
merchandizing his sole Business.
It is true, that formerly every one, who was a Buyer or Seller in the Retail
Way, was called a Merchant, and they continue to be deemed so still, both
in France and Holland; but here Shopkeepers, or those who attend Fairs
and Markets, have lost that Appellation.
Id. at 29 (erroneously paginated as page 1).
One passage in Beawes book at first looks like it might support a broad economic
definition of commerce. But it actually is a list of reasons why British commerce (in
the sense of exchange) had been so successful: the commodities are copious and are
high quality. Here is the passage:
I shall in the Body of the Work speak of the British Commerce as it stands
at present, and, in the mean Time, beg Leave to congratulate my
Countrymen on their happy Situation for carrying it on, which is hardly to
be equalled, not surpassed in any Country in the world....
Her Lands may justly be counted, some of the most fertile, and their
Products of Fruits, Provisions, &c. as plentiful and as good as any in
Europe, and her Merchandizes more than other countries can boast of.
Her different Counties, according to their Situation, produce Corn, and
every Necessary of Life in Abundance, which, on many Occasions, have
kept several of our Neighbours from starving.
We have Hemp and Flax for the manufacturing our Linens and Canvas,
now brought to great Perfection, and our Pastures feed an almost infinite
Number of Cattle, which not only supply our Markets with excellent Food,
but furnish us with fine Wools, and the best Leather in the World.
Our Mines produce Iron, Lead, Tin, Copper, Coal, &c. in Abundance, and
our Forests and Woods are so well stocked with Oak for Shipping, as seems
to promise (under our well-regulated Laws) an inexhaustible Supply.
Our Seas are well filled with their finny Inhabitants, which, according to
the Steps lately taken by the Legislature for an Encouragement of our
Fisheries, and ready Concurrence of our Merchants for Promoting so
beneficial a Design, must prove productive of immense Riches to the
Nation, besides occasionally providing comfortably for our Poor, which
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The leading commercial law treatise at the time probably
was Charles Molloy's De Jure Maritimo. Like other authors,
Molloy paired commerce with trade and traffic.1 90 Although one
could find a hint of a broader definition in his prefatory comment
that, "From whence it is that all Mankind (present or to come)
are either Traders by themselves or others," he later became
explicit that by commerce he meant exchange: "Hence it is, that
Men knowing each others [sic] Necessaries, are invited to
Traffick and Commerce in the different Parts and Immensities of
this vast World to supply each others Necessities, and adorn the
Conveniencies of human Life."191
Moreover, in his substantive discussion of merchants, he
drew the same distinctions we have seen heretofore: merchants
were those professionally engaged in "commerce," while
manufacturers and the like were not merchants but "artificers."
Molloy's entire defining section on merchants appears in the
footnote. 192
D. Abridgments and Digests
The eighteenth century saw a proliferation of digests,
usually called "abridgments." These included references to
Advantages have for many Years past been reaped by our industrious
Neighbours.
Id. at 19.
190 See MOLLOY, supra note 2, at iv (pairing "traffick and commerce"); id. at vi,
viii (pairing "trade and commerce").
191 Id. at iv.
192 Those who have read earlier footnotes will find Molloy's language very
familiar:
Every one that buys and sells is not from thence to be denominated a
Merchant, but only he who trafficks in the way of Commerce, by
Importation or Exportation; or otherwise in the way of Emption [buying],
Vendition [selling], Barter, Permutation, or Exchange, and which makes it
his Living to buy and sell, and that by a continued Assiduity, or frequent
Negotiation in the Mystery of Merchandizing: But those that buy Goods to
reduce them by their own Art and Industry into other Forms than formerly
they were of, are properly called Artificers, not Merchants: Not but
Merchants may do and alter Commodities after they have bought them for
the more expedite Sale of them, but that renders them not Artificers, but
the same is part of the Mystery of Merchants; but Persons buying
Commodities, though they alter not the Form, yet if they are such as sell
the same at future Days of Payment for greater Price than they cost them,
they are not properly called Merchants, but are Usurers, though they obtain
several other Names, as Warehouse-keepers, and the like; but Bankers, and
such as deal by Exchange, are properly called Merchants.
Id. at 319-20 (italics in original).
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treatises and statutes as well as case law, but most of the
references were from cases. The abridgments track essentially
the same material I already have quoted. The following comes
from Matthew Bacon's abridgment:
But these Privileges are not to be extended (i) to every one who
buys and sells; nor is he from thence, says Molloy, to be
denominated a Merchant, which Appellation peculiarly belongs
to him who trafficks in the Way of Commerce by Importation or
Exportation; or otherwise, in the Way of Emption, Vendition,
Barter, Permutation or Exchange; and who makes it his Living
to buy and sell, and that by a continued Assiduity, or frequent
Negotiation in the Mystery of Merchandizing; but those, who
buy Goods to reduce them by their own Art or Industry in other
Forms than formerly they were of, are properly called Artificers,
not Merchants. 193
Similarly, the 1780 edition of John Comyn's Digest stated:
And, generally, every one shall be a Merchant, who trafficks by
way of Buying and Selling, or Bartering of Goods or any
Merchandize, within the Realm, or in Foreign Parts. Sal. 445.
So, if a Man draw a Bill of Exchange, he will be a Merchant for
that Purpose. Vide Post, (F. 4.).194
The general approach of the abridgments, therefore, is the
same as in primary and in other secondary sources. As I
suggested earlier, the repetition of the same meanings, the same
definitions, must have seared them into the minds of those
founders with access to and interest in the subject.
VI. WHY THESE FINDINGS SHOULD BE No SURPRISE
A. The Latinate Nature of Eighteenth-Century English
One seeking to read intelligently the writings and debates of
the eighteenth century must know some Latin. These materials
are filled with classical quotations' 95 and blocks of untranslated
Latin. This is particularly true of English judicial opinions.
Moreover, eighteenth century English usage tended to follow
193 Merchant and Merchandize, in 3 BACON, supra note 2 (italics in original).
194 4 COMYNS, supra note 2, at 227 (italics in original).
195 See, e.g., Luke v. Lyde, (1759) 2 Burr. 882, 887, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617 (K.B.)
(reporting Lord Mansfield's unattributed quotation of Cicero, set forth supra note
124).
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Latin models, 196 both because English was then temporally closer
to Latin, and because education was imbued heavily with Latin
literature. 197  A symptom of the tie between Latin and
eighteenth-century English is the connection between
"commerce" and "commercium." The fact that the Latin word
always denoted some sort of interchange' 98 strongly suggests that
its English counterpart was used that way as well. 199
B. The Constitutional Text
As other writers have observed, 200 adopting a definition of
"commerce" as broad as that proposed by Professor Crosskey (or
broader) 201 forces one to struggle vainly with the natural import
of the Constitution's text. If we read "Commerce among the
several States" to mean "all gainful economic activity among the
several States," then the clauses by which Congress is
empowered to regulate commerce with "foreign Nations" and the
"Indian Tribes" become either largely redundant or
nonsensical. 20 2 Even more seriously, if the Commerce Clause
grants Congress power to regulate all economic activities, then
some of Congress' other economic powers become surplus. To be
sure, as Alexander Hamilton admitted, a very few phrases in the
Constitution (such as the Supremacy and Necessary and Proper
Clauses) are substantive surplus.20 3  Adopting the Crosskey
19r See MCDONALD, supra note 2, at xi (discussing the Latinate English of the
founding generation); GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 93 (1978).
197 See Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative,
Referendum, and the Constitution's Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 815
(2002) (delineating classical influences); CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE
CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 1-2, 12-13, 20
(1994) (outlining the founders' devotion to the Greco-Roman classics and to the Latin
language).
198 See supra note 96.
199 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 530 (George Mason, paraphrasing Virgil).
For this reason, as I have observed elsewhere, those are heavily handicapped who
try to do constitutional interpretation without a working knowledge of the Old
Tongue. Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An
Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 15 n.72 (2003).
200 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 1393-99.
201 Cf. AMAR, supra note 2, at 107-08 (suggesting that the word in the
Constitution means non-economic as well as economic interrelationships of all kinds
among the states and with foreign nations).
202 See Epstein, supra note 2, at 1393-94; see also United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 584-85 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
203 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 158 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey
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definition of commerce, however, leaves much more of the
document hanging useless.
For example, under the Crosskey interpretation, regulating
bankruptcy would be a legitimate exercise of authority under the
Commerce Clause. This would leave as surplus the express
congressional power to adopt "uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States. '' 20 4 This is more
than a problem with form, since the English legal tradition
thought of bankruptcy law as very distinct from, although
affecting and benefitting, 20 5 commerce. Unlike commerce, which
was governed mostly through the organic growth of the Lex
Mercatoria, bankruptcy was created and regulated by statute. 20 6
That is why the language in the two spheres was different. In
the law of commerce, the word "trade" meant mercantile
exchange. In the law of bankruptcy, the word "trader"20 7 was
defined to include many people engaged in gainful activity (e.g.,
manufacturers) who were not merchants. 208
& James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001) (1788) ("[These clauses] are only
declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable
implication from the very act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it
with certain specified powers.").
204 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
205 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *472 ("[A]t present the laws of
bankruptcy are considered as laws calculated for the benefit of trade."); 4 COKE,
supra note 2, at 277 (describing effect of bankruptcy on merchants and their trade).
206 See 4 COKE, supra note 2, at 277-78 (describing contemporaneous
bankruptcy law); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *474-76 (same).
207 Pursuant to 13 Eliz., c. 7 (1570).
208 See Case of Bankrupts (Smith v. Mills), 2 Co. Rep. 25a, 76 Eng. Rep. 441,
442-44 (K.B. 1589) (containing an exhaustive list of the professions considered and
not considered "traders" within the meaning of the contemporaneous bankruptcy
statutes); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *474-77.
For more recent cases on the scope of the word "trader" within the meaning of
the bankruptcy statutes, see, for example, Parker v. Wells, (1787) 1 Bro. P.C. 545, 1
Eng. Rep. 747, 747 (H.L.) (holding that a farmer who used his land to manufacture
and sell bricks was a trader within the bankruptcy statutes); Hankey v. Jones,
(1778) 2 Cowp. 745, 98 Eng. Rep. 1339, 1339 (K.B.) (Mansfield, C.J.) (drawing bills of
exchange to pay large bills and reimbursing drawees with interest does not make
one a trader within the bankruptcy laws); Dally v. Smith, (1768) 4 Burr. 2148, 98
Eng. Rep. 120, 120 (K.B.) (holding that a butcher is within the bankruptcy laws);
Saunderson v. Rowles, (1767) 4 Burr. 2064, 98 Eng. Rep. 77, 77 (K.B.) (Mansfield,
C.J.) (holding that a "victualler" (restaurant owner] was not a trader for purposes of
the bankruptcy laws since he didn't buy and sell on contracts); Newton v. Trigg,
(1690) 3 Mod. 327, 87 Eng. Rep. 217, 217 (K.B.) (holding that an innkeeper was not a
trader for purposes of the bankruptcy statutes); Hill v. Shish, (1687) 2 Shower. K.B.
512, 89 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1072 (K.B.) (holding that goldsmiths were traders within the
bankruptcy laws); Crisp v. Pratt, (1639) Cro. Car. 549, 79 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1072
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In addition to rendering nugatory the Bankruptcy Clause,
the Crosskey definition of "commerce" would turn the Intellectual
Property Clause20 9 into surplus. It could have a similar effect on
the power to build dockyards 210 to the extent done for economic
purposes, and on the separate authority to "establish Post Offices
and Post Roads. '211 Yet the Constitution's drafters enumerated
all those items separately from commerce precisely because,
while they recognized that such things were aids to commerce,
the legal tradition treated them as conceptually distinct from
commerce.212
The framers did enumerate separately from commerce
certain other powers that the legal tradition considered part of
commercial regulation. Among these was the power to regulate
weights and measures. 21 3 The obvious reason was to allow
Congress to regulate weights and measures in all parts of the
country, and not merely "among the several States." Similarly,
the legal tradition considered the issuing and regulation of
money as part of regulating commerce. 214  The Constitution's
grant of authority to "coin Money, regulate the Value thereof,
and of foreign Coin '215 and to "provide for the Punishment of
counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United
(K.B.) (holding that an innkeeper, as such, is not a trader within the bankruptcy
statutes); Crumpe v. Barne, (1626) Cro. Car. 31, 79 Eng. Rep. 630, 630 (K.B.)
(holding that a shoemaker is a trader within the bankruptcy statutes). Also see
BEAWES, supra note 2, at 487-88 (providing a list of persons who could be
bankrupts); 1 COMYNS, supra note 2, at 503-04.
My impression is that by the time of the founding a judicial reluctance had
developed to include more non-merchants within the scope of the "trader," see, e.g.,
Saunderson, 4 Burr. at 2066-69, 98 Eng. Rep. at 78-79, but non-merchant
occupations were added when precedent so demanded. See, e.g., Parker, 1 Bro. P.C.
at 548, 1 Eng. Rep. at 749-50.
209 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
210 Id. at cl. 17 ("To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever.., over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of... dock-Yards . .
211 Id. at cl. 7.
212 See supra note 114 (post office distinct from commerce); infra note 221 (post
office connected with commerce); infra note 224 (naval installations are aids to
commerce).
213 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *274-75.
214 See id. at 276.
215 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
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States" 216 ensured that the Congress could govern the medium of
exchange throughout the nation, not merely across state lines.
If we add to Crosskey's vision of "commerce" as "all gainful
economic activity" his view that "among the several States"
meant "throughout the United States," then, of course, the
damage to the text becomes even greater, for the weights and
measures and financial powers become surplus as well.217 I
should add that if we adopt Professor Amar's theory that
"commerce" means social intercourse of all kinds, the textual
damage is even worse.218
Listing all the enumerated powers that become useless
through overly expansive interpretation of "commerce" reminds
one of Justice Thomas' argument that the modern "substantial
effects" test has similar results.219 For that test renders surplus
all enumerated powers over matters that substantially affect
commerce: bankruptcy, intellectual property, money,220 the post
office,221 forts,222 weights and measures, 223 dockyards2 4-in other
216 Id. at cl. 6.
217 Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 194-95 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)
(noting that a construction allowing Congress to regulate purely internal commerce
would defeat the purpose of the enumeration in the Commerce Clause).
218 His approach also turns some of Congress' other powers into surplus-e.g.,
the "high [s]eas" power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, and the power to declare war,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Further, it creates irreconcilable conflicts. If Congress
may regulate non-economic intercourse with foreign nations, then its powers are in
direct conflict with the foreign affairs authority of the President. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl.
2. Further, the invasion portion of the Guarantee Clause, id. at art. IV, § 4, becomes
problematic.
219 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
220 The English legal tradition specifically connected money with the regulation
of commerce. See, e.g., Le Case de Mixt Moneys, (1604) Dav. 18, 19, 80 Eng. Rep. 507
(K.B. [Ire.]) ("money fuit invent, cibien [pour] facilitie de commerce"); An Information
against Bates, (1606) Lane. 22, 23-24,145 Eng. Rep. 267, 268 (Exch.) (referring to
coinage as created in part for commerce and for the better security of merchants);
Case of Mines, (1568) 1 P1. Com. 310, 315-16, 75 Eng. Rep. 472, 480 (Exch.)
(discussing the role of coin in promoting commerce); Anonymous, 3 Salk. 157, 91
Eng. Rep. 750 (court and date not given) (referring to money as an aid to commerce).
221 The English legal tradition also connected the post office with commerce.
Lane v. Cotton, (1699) Carth. 487, 90 Eng. Rep. 880, 881 (K.B.) (stating that post
offices were created "to advance trade and commerce for the benefit of the subject
chiefly"); id., 90 Eng. Rep. at 882 ("for the ease and benefit of the subject in respect
to commerce and trade"); see also Rowning v. Goodchild, (1773) 3 Wils. K.B. 443,
450, 95 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1150 (K.B.) (referring to the benefit to "trade and commerce"
from letter carrying), while holding that it was not itself commerce); supra note 114.
222 Cf. An Information, Lane at 27, 145 Eng. Rep. at 271 (referring to bulwarks
and fortresses as created in part for commerce and for the better security of
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words, a very large chunk of Article I, Section 8. Intellectual
honesty, therefore, compels us to admit that interpretations of
that kind simply are insupportable.
That the framers chose to enumerate so many economic
powers separately-including some considered allied to
commerce-thus confirms what we have discovered about the
legal meaning of "commerce" at the time of the founding.
C. "Sexual Intercourse Among the Several States?"
It is not necessary to the purpose of this article to prove that
"commerce" and "general commerce" could never refer to the
economy as a whole. But to admit that it could be used that way,
certainly is not to admit that the Constitution does use it that
way.
To illustrate the point, recall that in the eighteenth century,
"commerce" could mean "sexual intercourse."225  Professor
Crosskey contended that "among the several States" meant
"throughout the United States," but I doubt if even he would read
the Commerce Clause as authorizing Congress to regulate sexual
intercourse throughout the United States."226  Similarly,
merchants).
223 The English legal tradition connected this subject to commerce. See supra
text accompanying note 167.
224 The English legal tradition connected naval installations to commerce. See
The King v. The Dock Company of Hull, (1786) 1 Term Report 219, 219, 99 Eng. Rep
1061. 1061 (K.B.) (referring to "an Act of Parliament... for making and establishing
Public Quays or Wharves at Kingston upon Hull, for the better securing His
Majesty's Revenues of Customs, and for the benefit of Commerce"); Corporation of
Kingston upon Hull v. Horner, (1774) Lofft. 576, 583, 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 810-11
(K.B.); An Information, Lane at 27, 145 Eng. Rep. at 271 (referring to ports as aids
to commerce).
225 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
226 No doubt by now the reader, assuming he has not wandered in more
licentious directions, may be wondering about Justice Marshall's ringing statement
in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824): "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is
something more: it is intercourse." Id. at 189.
But it was no more-because traffic, commerce, and intercourse were all
synonyms-whether one was referring to the economic, sexual, or social varieties.
Justice Marshall was using a rhetorical device to drive home a point that was so
obvious it should never have been contested at all. He did the same in several other
leading opinions, inducing some modern readers to think there was some profound
truth being enunciated with meaning beyond the immediate. I am thinking, for
example, of the phrase, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. [1 Cranch] 137,
177 (1803), which is no more than an adaptation into simple English of the Latin-
based word jurisdiction. Similarly: "we must never forget that it is a constitution we
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"commerce" could mean human social interaction generally, as in
"the Duke had regular commerce with Queen Elizabeth and her
court. ' 227 Yet surely the Constitution did not grant Congress
authority to regulate all human relationships. 228  Professor
Crosskey might distinguish these reductiones ad absurda by
responding that the Founders were particularly concerned about
economics. But of course the record shows they were very
concerned about morality, religion, and other things, too.229
D. American History Before 1787
Another reason the definition of "commerce" used in the
cases and legal texts should come as no surprise arises from
Founding Era history. In the years before 1765, Parliament had
limited its principal intervention in colonial affairs to imperial
commerce with a few supporting activities such as the post office.
When Parliament sought to promote imperial agriculture and
manufacturing, it did so mostly through trade laws rather than
directly.230 This was a familiar arrangement, and, the Americans
thought, a successful one. So it was readily accepted by the
leading colonial lawyer-pamphleteers of the 1760s--James
Otis,231 Daniel Dulany,232  Richard Bland,233  and John
are expounding," McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819), which is merely
an explanation for why the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be
applied in that particular context.
227 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
228 Pace Professor Amar, this position is clearly not tenable. Cf. AMAR, supra
note 2, at 107-08 (extending the constitutional meaning of "commerce" to even non-
economic relationships).
229 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 199-200 (reporting the discussion at the
North Carolina ratifying convention on religion and morality); id. at 44, 90, 117-20,
148, 172 (reporting discussions at the Massachusetts ratifying convention on religion
and morality); id. at 209, 217, 399, 402 (reporting discussions at the New York
ratifying convention on religion and practical morality).
230 See WHATELY, supra note 2, at 6, 9, 18, 21-22, 27, 31 (discussing the use of
trade laws in managing the imperial economy); Dickinson, supra note 2, at 28
(discussing how regulation of commerce had been used to promote the British
economy) (Letter 5); cf. supra note 170 and accompanying text (setting forth
Blackstone's description of how manufacturing was improved in England by
commercial regulations).
231 OTIS, supra note 2.
232 DULANY, supra note 2, at 46-47.
233 BLAND, supra note 2, at 1, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14-16.
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Dickinson 234-all of whom argued for a similar divisions between
central and colonial authority.235
In their arguments against Parliamentary taxation of the
colonies, these pamphleteers sought to turn this former, practice
legal division into a constitutional one. They were willing to
accept Parliamentary jurisdiction over imperial trade and over
certain closely-related affairs such as import duties and the post-
office, 236 but they opposed direct Parliamentary interference in
internal colonial affairs. At the outset, they argued only against
internal taxation, 237 but eventually they claimed for American
self-rule other aspects of the colonies' "internal police."238
234 Dickinson, supra note 2 at 28.
235 See, e.g., DULANY, supra note 2, at 46-47.
The Subordination of the Colonies, and the Authority of the Parliament to
preserve it, have been fully acknowledged. Not only the Welfare, but
perhaps the Existence of the Mother Country, as an independent Kingdom,
may depend upon her Trade and Navigation, and these so far upon her
Intercourse with the Colonies, that if this should be neglected, there would
soon be an End to that Commerce, whence her greatest Wealth is derived,
and upon which her maritime Power is principally founded. From these
Considerations, the Right of the British Parliament to regulate the Trade of
the Colonies, may be justly deduced....
Id.; see also Dickinson, supra note 2, at 7, 37.
Bland's concession was grudging. BLAND, supra note 2 ("It must be admitted
that after the Restoration the Colonies lost that Liberty of Commerce with foreign
Nations they had enjoyed before that Time.").
236 See OTIS, supra note 2, at 62 (tax on mariners; post office); DULANY, supra
note 2, at 49-55 (supporting right of Parliament to regulate colonial post office,
military in multiple colonies, and inheritance funds to pay commercial debts).
237 See, e.g., OTIS, supra note 2, at 38 (opposing British taxation); DULANY,
supra note 2, at 46, 47 ("It is a common, and frequently the most proper Method to
regulate Trade by Duties on Imports and Exports.") and passim (opposing other
British taxation); Dickinson, supra note 2, passim (opposing taxes imposed for the
sake of raising revenue rather than regulating).
238 See BLAND, supra note 2, at 17 (claiming right of internal taxation and
internal government); H. TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG
HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 174-81
(University of North Carolina Press 1998) (1965) (discussing Bland's influence and
ideas); Dickinson, supra note 2, at 4-5 (opposing Parliamentary mandates over the
colonies). But see id. at 13 (acknowledging that British power to prohibit
manufacture of iron and steel in colonies has not been contested, but not endorsing
the power himself); THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON, 1764-1774 173-
77 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1895) ("Resolutions Adopted by
the Assembly of Pennsylvania Relative to the Stamp Act," claiming for colonies
taxation power and trial by jury); id. at 193-96 ("A Petition to the King from the
Stamp Act Congress," claiming for the colonies "full power of legislation" and trial by
jury); City of Boston, Instructions for their Representatives, in OTIS, supra note 2, at
71 (claiming for colonies the power to make local laws "not repugnant to [those] of
England").
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In the 1770s, two later and more radical lawyer-
propagandists, James Wilson and Thomas Jefferson, refused to
concede to Parliament this commercial jurisdiction, contending
that the colonies' sole connection with Britain was through a
common Crown. 239 Yet Wilson at least was prepared to admit
that the king enjoyed authority over imperial commerce, since
commercial regulation traditionally had been part of the royal
prerogative. 240 Further, in 1774, John Adams adopted, and the
First Continental Congress promulgated, as official policy, a
formula similar to those supported by the lawyer-pamphleteers:
British control of commerce among entities in the empire;
colonial assemblies' control of their "internal polity."241
The Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781, departed
from this formula in that they did not grant the central authority
239 See WILSON, supra note 2; THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE
RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA (1774), available at http://www.yale.edullawweb
/avalonljeffsumm.htm.
240 See WILSON, supra note 2, at 34-35; see also Brownlow v. Cox, (1615) 3
Bulst. 32, 32, 81 Eng. Rep. 27, 27 (K.B.) (Coke, C.J.) (quoting Lord Bacon to the
effect that "The Kings prerogative hath four columns or pillars .... The fourth,
which concerns matters of commerce"); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES
*263-65.
241 See JOHN ADAMS, Novanglus; or, A History of the Dispute with America, in
THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 221, 245-46, 268 (1774) (Liberty
Fund ed., 2000) (arguing that Parliament has power over the colonies' commerce,
but that the colonies have control over their internal affairs); see also Declaration
and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, Oct. 14, 1774, in DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, H.R.
DOC. NO. 398, at 3 (1927), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb
/avalon/resolves.htm.
Resolved, 4. That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free
government, is a right in the people to participate in their legislative
council: and as the English colonists are not represented, and from their
local and other circumstances, cannot properly be represented in the
British parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive power of
legislation in their several provincial legislatures, where their right of
representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal
polity, subject only to the negative of their sovereign, in such manner as
has been heretofore used and accustomed: But, from the necessity of the
case, and a regard to the mutual interest of both countries, we cheerfully
consent to the operation of such acts of the British parliament, as are bona
fide, restrained to the regulation of our external commerce, for the purpose
of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother
country, and the commercial benefits of its respective members; excluding
every idea of taxation internal or external, for raising a revenue on the
subjects, in America, without their consent.
Id. (emphasis added).
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(Congress) power over inter-jurisdictional commerce. 242  The
unsatisfactory nature of the results must have confirmed in
Americans' minds the value of Britain's pre-Stamp Act approach.
Accordingly, the Virginia General Assembly called for the
conclave that became the Annapolis Convention of 1786, whose
goal it was to formulate a plan of central commercial
regulation. 243 The Annapolis Convention, in turn, adopted the
resolution that led to the Federal Convention. 244 That federal
convention recreated, with a few qualifications, 245 the division of
power between local and central governments that the pre-
Revolutionary lawyer-pamphleteers had recommended and the
first Continental Congress had proclaimed. Any grant to the
central authority of power to control "all gainful activity,"
however, would have been a radical departure from what
Americans had experienced and advocated previously, and a very
unlikely one.
E. Public Reception of the Commerce Clause and the Federalists'
Representations of Meaning
If, during the ratification debates, any significant segment of
the ratifying public-including anti-federalist lawyers-had read
"The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce" as
"The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate all interstate
gainful Activities," the Commerce Clause would have been
intensely controversial. In fact, it was uncontroversial. A review
of the records of the public ratification debate shows almost no
dissatisfaction with that Clause; on the contrary, anti-federalists
pronounced themselves quite satisfied with it.246 When anti-
242 See generally ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, in H.R. DOc. No. 398, at 27-37,
available at http://www.yale.eduIlawweb/avalon/artconf.htm.
243 See Resolution of the General Assembly of Virginia, January 21, 1786,
Proposing a Joint Meeting of Commissioners from the States to Consider and
Recommend a Federal Plan for Regulating Commerce, in H.R. DOC. NO. 398, at 38,
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/const03.htm.
244 See Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal
Government, Sept. 11, 1786, in H.R. DOC. No. 398, at 39, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/annapoli.htm.
245 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to tax).
246 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 124 (reporting Sam Adams, then an
antifederalist, praising the Commerce Clause at the Massachusetts ratifying
convention); Richard Henry Lee, Letters from the Federal Farmer, in EMPIRE AND
NATION 170 (Forrest McDonald ed., Liberty Fund 1999) (1962) (stating that the
commerce power and the power to regulate imposts together would give the union
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federalists charged that under the new Constitution Congress
could tyrannize over America, they almost invariably relied on
other provisions in the instrument to support their argument:
the General Welfare Clause, 247 the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 248 and a few others. 249 They virtually never complained
about the Commerce Clause.
Furthermore, in response to anti-federalist claims that the
Constitution would create a central government of excessive
reach, leading federalist spokesmen-most of them lawyers-
published lengthy lists of powers that, outside the capital
district, only the states would enjoy. I have dubbed these the
"enumerated powers of states."250  Some of them were non-
economic: governance of religion, training the militia, appointing
militia officers, control over local government, crimes malum in
se (except treason, piracy, and counterfeiting), maintenance of
state justice systems, and regulation of family affairs. 251 But
others fit easily within the Crosskey definition of commerce, so
the federalists' enumeration of them as reserved to the states is
flatly inconsistent with his hypothesis. They included real
property titles and conveyances; inheritance; the promotion of
useful arts in ways other than granting patents and copyrights;
regulation of personal property outside of commerce; governance
of the law of torts and contracts, except in suits between citizens
of different states; education; services for the poor and
unfortunate; licensing of public houses; roads other than post
roads; ferries and bridges; and fisheries, farms, and other
business enterprises. 252
sufficient power); Albany Anti-Federal Committee Circular, April 10, 1788, in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1379, 1383 ('Vith respect to the
Regulation of Trade, this may be vested in Congress under the present
Confederation ...."). See generally DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2 (revealing
lack of controversy over the Commerce Clause).
247 See Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust:
An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 30-38 (2003).
248 See Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2, at 292-96.
249 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 51-52 (Patrick Henry, at the Virginia
ratifying convention, criticizing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, for creating a capital
district under the full control of Congress).
250 See generally Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 469-94.
251 See id. at 481-85.
252 See id. at 481-88; see also Roger Sherman to Unknown Recipient, Dec. 8,
1787, in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSITUTION OF 1787, at 286, 288 (James H. Hutson ed. 1987) (stating that state
courts will have exclusive jurisdiction over "all causes between citizens of the same
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Since federalists often wrote pseudonymously, we do not
know the identity of all those who made these published
representations. Most of the known enumerators, however, were
leading figures in the federalist cause: James Madison;
Alexander Hamilton; James Wilson; Edmund Pendleton,
chancellor of Virginia; James Iredell, North Carolina attorney
general, judge, and later U.S. Supreme Court Justice; John
Marshall; Alexander Contee Hanson, a Congressman from
Maryland; Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant, a Justice (and shortly
thereafter, Chief Justice) of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court; and Alexander White, a distinguished Virginia lawyer,
delegate to his state's ratifying convention, and later a U.S.
Representative. Tench Coxe, whom supporters of the Crosskey
view mis-cite as an advocate of a broad meaning of commerce, 253
actually was the single most prolific public enumerator of
powers-economic and otherwise-that the federal government
would not have.254
To my knowledge, no one has made any attempt to address
why, if commerce means all economic activity, so many respected
individuals-nearly all of them prominent lawyers of sterling
reputation 25 5 -could place so many economic activities outside
the federal sphere.
VII. THE COASEAN CONSTITUTION
Given the state of the historical record, why have so many
intelligent scholars been confused as to the actual scope of the
Commerce Clause? Part of the answer, of course, is emotional:
Most of these scholars support, or at least accept, the modern
regulatory state, 256 and would prefer to be free from the disquiet
States, except where they claim lands under grants of different States").
253 See Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 20 n.76; 1 CROSSKEY,
supra note 2, at 109-10; W. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 169-73.
254 See Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 479-89 (identifying the
contributions of each of these individuals).
255 Of those on the list, only Madison (who had studied law) and Coxe were not
lawyers. Coxe is described by Professors Nelson and Pushaw as "a distinguished
economist." Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 20 n.76. He was, in fact,
a Philadelphia businessman, and a friend of Hamilton. See generally JACOB COOKE,
TENCH COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1978).
256 See, e.g., Nelson & Pushaw, Critique, supra note 2, at 716-17 (criticizing the
policy implications of returning to a narrow understanding of the Commerce
Clause).
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that arises from the conviction that it is, in large part,
unconstitutional.
I believe, however, that another reason is a common pattern
of modern thought. Modern writers tend to assume either one of
two things about the Founders:
(1) The Founders conceptually and legally divided commerce
from manufacturing, agriculture, and other activities because
those fields were not as interdependent as they are today.
Therefore, modern conditions of interdependence require us to re-
interpret their work.
(2) The Founders did recognize that interdependence, so they
must have intended to treat powers of economic governance as a
unity.
In my experience the first assumption is the more
common. 257  The second is the Crosskey view. 258  Both are
incorrect.
They are incorrect because Anglo-American lawyers and
lawgivers (a) recognized the interdependence of commerce with
257 See, e.g., Jefferson B. Fordham, The States in the Federal System-Vital Role
or Limbo?, 49 VA. L. REV. 666, 668 (1963) ("Ours is now an interdependent national
economy. Effective regulation must be country-wide in extent."); William P. Murphy,
State Sovereignty and the Constitution-A Summary View, 33 MISS. L.J. 353, 358
(1962) ("In a complex and interdependent industrial society.., what was local
yesterday today has assumed dimensions and effects which transcend state
boundary lines. Much of the increased activity of the national government in this
century has resulted from the fact that modern society generates problems which
are beyond the capacity of individual states to control."); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 644 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("If we now ask why the
formalistic economic/noneconomic distinction might matter today, after its rejection
in Wickard, the answer is not that the majority fails to see causal connections in an
integrated economic world."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("That fundamental restraint on our power forecloses us
from reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th-
century economy .... Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the
assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable
national economy."); Karl A. Crowley, States' Rights and Responsibilities and the
Federal Constitution, (Jul. 4, 1935), in Proceedings of the Texas Bar Association:
Volume LIV, 1935 TEX. L. REV. 76, 87 (expressing similar sentiments in address to
state bar association).
258 See Nelson & Pushaw, Critique, supra note 2, at 707 (arguing that because
the founding generation saw economic activity [commerce in the broad sense] as an
"organic whole," they therefore provided for it to be regulated as an organic whole);
see also W. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 23-24, 62 (discussing the interrelationship
between commerce and other activities in the founders' times); AMAR, supra note 2,
at 107-08 (arguing that commerce included all social intercourse and suggesting
that the finished Constitution embodied the approach of the Virginia Plan).
[Vol. 80:789
LEGAL MEANING OF "COMMERCE"
other economic activities,259 but (b) still severed it conceptually
and legally from other economic activities. 260 In other words,
they consciously engaged in what Justice Souter has disparaged
as "categorical formalism." 261
We know the Founders understood that commerce and the
economy in general were intimately related as a matter of fact,
for the surviving records of the debates contain numerous
statements acknowledging-trumpeting, really-the inter-
dependence of commerce, manufactures, agriculture, land prices,
foreign trade, and the like.262
Early in the federal convention, the delegates leaned toward
creating a constitutional reality to match the economic reality-
the scheme of "externality federalism" embodied in the Virginia
Plan. The Virginia Plan would have granted Congress plenary
power to regulate the economy, and all negative externalities
spilling over state lines, that is: (1) all powers that Congress had
enjoyed under the Confederation, plus (2) power over matters in
which "the separate States are incompetent," plus (3) powers
necessary to "the harmony of the United States," plus
(4) a plenary veto over state legislation. 263
Ultimately, however, the federal convention-and even more
emphatically the ratifying public-rejected that approach.264
259 See, e.g., supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas
Whately's pamphlet and a passage in Blackstone's Commentaries).
260 See supra Part V.
261 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 644-45 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
262 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(providing examples of the Founders' understanding of an interrelated economy); 21
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1281-83, 1291 (quoting various popular
"toasts" in which commerce is recited separately from agriculture and
manufactures); N.Y. INDEP. J., Jul. 9, 1788, reprinted in id. at 1307-08 (describing
connection between commerce, agriculture, manufactures, and morals); id. at 1635
(described hoped-for benefits to bakers from commerce). See generally Natelson,
Enumerated, supra note 2.
263 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 21.
264 There have been occasional suggestions that the ultimate proposal for
enumerated powers represented merely a translation of the Virginia Plan, see, e.g.,
AMAR, supra note 2, at 108 n.*, but they are not very convincing. First, if the goal
was to adopt the power scheme in the Virginia Plan, then there would be no need to
alter the wording so radically. Second, the federalists' subsequent public
enumeration of state powers is utterly inconsistent with the Virginia Plan's scheme,
and it is as morally certain as any historical speculation can be that nothing like the
Virginia Plan ever would have been ratified. See generally Natelson, Enumerated,
supra note 2, at 472-89 (detailing the nationalists' retreat from the "externality
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They chose instead a division of sovereignty more familiar to
them and one they could sell to the ratifying public. They chose
the route suggested by the colonial lawyer-pamphleteers, who
had proposed a constitutional division of authority between those
who regulated "commerce" (meaning only economic trade and
intercourse) 265 and those who governed the remainder of the
economy, even while recognizing the profound impact each had
on the other.266  With the safeguard of the Bill of Rights
promised, the ratifying public assented.
That there was a conscious decision to divide legally what
was connected economically is difficult for some modern
commentators to accept-particularly those who want
government to swat at every buzzing externality. But through
hard experience, the founding generation had gained an insight
rediscovered in modern times by Nobel Laureate Ronald
federalism" of the Virginia Plan).
265 See Dickinson, supra note 2, at 8-9 (Letter 2) ('All before, are calculated to
regulate trade, and preserve or promote a mutually beneficial intercourse between
the several constituent parts of the empire; and though many of them imposed
duties on trade, yet those duties were always imposed with design to restrain the
commerce of one part, that was injurious to another, and thus to promote the
general welfare."); id. at 22 ("Commerce was at a low ebb, and surprising instances
might be produced how little it was attended to for a succession of ages. The terms
that have been mentioned, and, among the rest, that of "tax," had obtained a
national, parliamentary meaning, drawn from the principles of the constitution, long
before any Englishman thought of imposition of duties, for the regulation of trade.");
id. at 28 ("But in more modern ages, the spirit of violence being, in some measure, if
the expression may be allowed, sheathed in commerce, colonies have been settled by
the nations of Europe for the purposes of trade."); see also BLAND, supra note 2, at 25
(equating commerce with trade: "Why is the Trade of the Colonies more
circumscribed than the Trade of Britain?.. . Their Commerce ought to be equally
free with the Commerce of Britain....") (emphasis omitted). Compare Dickinson,
supra note 2, at 23-24 (distinguishing external taxes, for regulation of trade, from
internal taxes on manufactures), and id. at 27-28 (referring to fact that commerce
has grown "in more modern ages," although presumably earlier ages had economic
activity), and id. at 31 (quoting a passage listing "trade and commerce, agriculture
and manufacturers"), with DULANY, supra note 2, at 36 (setting forth similar
distinctions), and OTIS, supra note 2, at 56 (distinguishing traders from
manufacturers), and City of Boston, Instructions for Their Representatives, in OTIS,
supra note 2, at 68-69 (distinguishing, apparently, trade from manufacture).
266 See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 2, at 8 (citing a statute regulating imports
and exports which "forms the foundation of the laws relating to our trade," and
recites among its purposes the stimulation of manufacturing and employment in
manufacturing). On the wide American recognition of the interrelationship of
commerce with the rest of the economy, see supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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Coase 267: sometimes it is more trouble to swat an externality
than to suffer it.
In the debates of 1787-91 the founding generation
considered at length the benefits and costs of "externality
federalism." They decided that the cost-the inefficiencies of
centralized government and the risks posed to personal
freedom-was too high to justify the benefits. Just as in your
daily life, you refrain from calling the cops merely because the
neighbors' dog strays onto your land, so the founding generation
accepted certain constitutional incongruities so as to retain the
advantages of federalism.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have inquired into the meaning of the legal
term "commerce" at the time the Constitution was written,
debated, and ratified. I consulted all reported English court
cases from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries;
all American cases before 1790 available on the Westlaw
database; all of the leading abridgments and digests of English
law; prominent legal treatises; popular legal dictionaries; and
pamphlets written by prominent American and British attorneys
on the dispute between the colonies and the mother country.
In these sources, the word "commerce" nearly always has an
economic meaning. When used economically, the word was
bound tightly with the Lex Mercatoria and the sort of activities
engaged in by merchants: buying and selling products made by
others (and sometimes land), associated finance and financial
instruments, navigation and other carriage, and intercourse
across jurisdictional lines. I uncovered almost no evidence that
there was a predominant legal meaning, or even a common legal
meaning, that included all gainful economic activities. I also
examined a few instances sometimes cited as illustrations of a
broader definition, and found none that clearly reflected such a
definition. When used in legal discourse, "commerce" did not
include agriculture, manufacturing, mining, malum in se crime,
or land use. Nor did it include activities that merely
"substantially affected" commerce; on the contrary, the cases
include wording explicitly distinguishing such activities from
commerce.
267 RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 20-30 (1988).
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Lawyers drew a conceptual and legal boundary between
commerce and other economic activities in full recognition that in
the real world these very much affected each other. This study
has provided additional support for the conclusion that, for
reasons of policy and politics, the founding generation inserted
this conceptual and legal boundary into the Constitution. The
clear inference from these findings collectively is that the
Commerce Clause was designed to give Congress jurisdiction
over the law merchant insofar as it pertained to inter-
jurisdictional activities. This was the same jurisdiction that pre-
Revolution American pamphleteers had conceded to Parliament.
I listed several reasons why these findings should come as no
surprise. These include (1) the close connection, in the
eighteenth century, between the English word "commerce" and
its Latin analogue "commercium," which is always used in the
sense of "intercourse," (2) the text of the Constitution and the
absurd textual results that follow when "commerce" is given a
broad meaning, (3) the uncontroversial nature of the Commerce
Clause during the ratification debates, and (4) the public
representations as to the limits of federal power proffered by
leading federalists, most of them distinguished lawyers, during
those debates.
Some will object to these findings on practical grounds. In
arguing against Professor Barnett's similar conclusions,
Professor Pushaw has asked, "Does anyone seriously believe that
Congress or the Court will, or should, dismantle the entire [post-
New Deal] Commerce Clause framework?" 268 Presumably, this
means these findings are practically irrelevant, and so should not
be published. Professor Pushaw then quoted Robert Bork, "It
appears that the American people would be overwhelmingly
against such a change."269  Presumably, this means these
findings are unpopular, and so should not be published, and any
court decisions that might be based on them would be unpopular
and so should not be issued.
268 Pushaw, Methods, supra note 2, at 1201.
269 Id. at 1202 (quoting Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the
Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L.
PUB POLVY 849, 851 (2002)); cf. Nelson & Pushaw, Critique, supra note 2, at 699
(calling the Barnett conclusions, which are much like mine, "radically
destabilizing").
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I believe it is a sufficient answer to such concerns that policy
preferences should not affect the search for historical truth-or
for any other kind of truth. My explorations frequently lead to
constitutional results I find distasteful, but that is no reason to
suppress the results. The reputation of legal history is already
bad enough without my compromising it further.270
For those not satisfied with that answer-who think that
such an attitude partakes too much of "fiat justitia, ruat
coelum"271-let me suggest two other possible responses.
First, as to whether such findings make any difference:
Rapid constitutional change does, in fact, happen from time to
time, and may take unexpected directions. The New Deal
revolution itself is an excellent example. Within the space of a
decade, a federal government with clearly limited economic
powers became a government of almost plenary economic
powers-a development unthinkable a few years earlier. More
recently, we have seen a worldwide mega-trend in the other
direction, a trend toward decentralization and economic freedom.
This also has resulted in previously unthinkable outcomes: the
collapse of European Communism; sweeping Margaret Thatcher-
style reforms in Britain, New Zealand, Ireland, Israel, and
elsewhere; devolution of power from central to regional
authorities in Britain and elsewhere; a rush toward capitalism in
China; the division of Czechoslovakia into two nations,
Yugoslavia into five, and the USSR into fifteen. Meanwhile, the
principal efforts in the other direction, such as the drive for a
European Constitution, have foundered. In this respect, one
could argue that the United States is lagging behind the trend,
and that it eventually will catch up, and when it does catch up,
people will be looking for reasons-including constitutional
reasons-to justify it.
Second, as to Judge Bork's comment about the presumed
popularity of the post-New Deal regulatory state: If it really is
true that the American people overwhelming favor the federal
regulatory state in toto (as opposed to favoring particular
270 Among the many criticisms of "lawyer's legal history"-the distortion of
historical methods and findings to serve advocacy purposes--one of the most colorful
is that of Professor Morton Horwich: "The main thrust of lawyer's legal history,
then, is to pervert the real function of history by reducing it to the pathetic role of
justifying the world as it is." Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the
Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 281 (1973).
271 "Let justice be done though the heavens fall."
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programs), then findings like those in this article present no
threat at all. Even if the Supreme Court were to adopt them,
they would do no harm, because corrective constitutional
amendments would sail through quickly. I have no doubt, for
example, that if an originalist Supreme Court struck down the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, a saving amendment would be adopted
in a matter of weeks. As indeed it should be.
I do not think, however, the most important concern among
advocates of the regulatory state is that the American people
would object to originalist court decisions. I think the most
important concern for advocates of the regulatory state is lurking
fear that the American people might readily accept, even
appreciate or be relieved at, such decisions. Recent history has
shown that even when individuals benefit from particular
regulatory or welfare programs, they often perceive the collective
contraption to be a negative sum game. Under such
circumstances people can be induced to part with their favorite
programs so long as others are induced to part with theirs. 272
I emphasize again, that such considerations are not mine;
they are offered for those for whom legal scholarship is
principally a consequentialist endeavor. For my purposes, it is
enough to say that, from a purely originalist point of view, cases
like Carter Coal Co. 273 and Schechter Poultry274 were rightly
decided after all.
272 Roger Douglas, the finance minister who was the principal architect of New
Zealand's reforms, notes that a hallmark of successful economic liberalization is
rapid change, across the board, in which everyone participates. See ROGER DOUGLAS,
UNFINISHED BUSINESS 22-27 (1993) (describing lessons from economic liberalization
in New Zealand).
273 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
274 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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